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ABSTRACT 
Seeds for countless alternative futures already exist in anticipatory imaginaries and 
projects, and in possibilities for action. The novel approach of critical-analytical 
futures studies enables systematically studying anticipatory future-making processes 
and possibilities for agency. Critical-analytical futures studies develops the tradition 
of critical futures studies by incorporating an understanding of historical processes, 
causal mechanisms and negotiation among actors with future-oriented projects. 
Privacy in the digital age seems to be simultaneously a grand challenge and a 
relatively minor issue. Currently actors are breathlessly racing to ensure and define 
breathing space. In other words, they debate the meanings of privacy in a context 
where datafication seriously undermines privacy. This dissertation investigates the 
anticipatory co-evolution of imaginaries and institutions in making futures of privacy 
in Europe. Privacy protection is defined as a social institution at the intersection of 
three types of anticipatory practices: anticipatory institutional change, surveillance 
practices and anticipation in everyday life. By regulating surveillance, privacy rules 
maintain a societal future orientation that leaves space for creativity, imagination and 
human agency. 
The analytical framework is operationalised through four stages for qualitatively 
studying anticipatory institutional change: 1) historical context, 2) investigation of 
actor storylines, 3) analysis of deeper imaginaries, and 4) identification of latent 
future possibilities. This approach, developed in this dissertation, is termed CASIL 
(context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents). 
The five original studies develop different aspects of the four methodological 
stages. The overall temporal landscape features two competing imaginaries, 
continued growth and tragic loss. Decision-makers in the European Union are 
navigating between these imaginaries and trying to maintain a positive role for 
Europe. The discussion section identifies numerous latent possibilities for promoting 
a systemic understanding of privacy as ‘breathing space for futures’. However, there 
is a strategic tradeoff for privacy advocates between increasing the regulation of 
surveillance practices and taming the roots of surveillance. 
KEYWORDS: futures studies, critical futures studies, anticipation, cultural political 
economy, privacy, data protection, institutional change  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Lukemattomien tulevaisuuksien siemenet ovat olemassa imaginaareissa ja 
toiminnan mahdollisuuksissa. Uusi kriittis-analyyttisen tulevaisuuksientutkimuksen 
lähestymistapa mahdollistaa tulevaisuuden tekemisen prosessien ja toimijuuden 
mahdollisuuksien tutkimisen. Kriittis-analyyttisessä tulevaisuuksientutkimuksessa 
kehitetään kriittistä tulevaisuuksientutkimusta tutkimalla historiallisia prosesseja, 
kausaalisia mekanismeja sekä toimijoiden ja projektien välistä neuvottelua. 
Digitaalisella aikakaudella yksityisyys näyttäytyy samanaikaisesti suurena yh-
teiskunnallisena haasteena ja verrattain vähäisenä kysymyksenä. Toimijat pyrkivät 
hengästyneesti määrittelemään hengitystilaa, eli he väittelevät yksityisyyden 
merkityksistä tilanteessa, jossa dataistuminen heikentää yksityisyyden edellytyksiä. 
Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan imaginaarien ja instituutioiden koevoluutiota yksityisyyden 
tulevaisuuden tekemisprosessissa Euroopassa. Yksityisyyden suoja määritellään 
yhteiskunnalliseksi instituutioksi, joka on kolmenlaisten antisipatoristen käytäntöjen 
välissä: antisipatorisen institutionaalisen muutoksen, valvontakäytäntöjen ja joka-
päiväisen ennakoinnin. Yksityisyyssäännöt säätelevät valvontaa ja pitävät yllä 
luovuuden ja inhimillisen toimijuuden mahdollistavaa tulevaisuussuuntautumista. 
Antisipatorista institutionaalista muutosta tutkitaan laadullisesti nelivaiheisen 
kehikon avulla. Vaiheet ovat 1) historiallisen kontekstin huomioiminen, 2) 
toimijoiden tarinalinjojen tutkiminen, 3) taustalla olevien imaginaarien analysointi 
sekä 4) piilevien mahdollisuuksien tunnistaminen. 
Väitöskirjan viisi artikkelia käsittelevät kehikon eri osia. Kokonaiskuvassa 
voidaan nähdä kaksi kilpailevaa imaginaaria: jatkuva kasvu ja traaginen menetys. 
Euroopan unionin päätöksentekijät navigoivat näiden imaginaarien välillä ja 
yrittävät ylläpitää Euroopan positiivista roolia. Väitöskirjassa tunnistetaan piileviä 
mahdollisuuksia edistää systeemistä ymmärrystä yksityisyydestä, jossa yksityisyys 
nähdään ”hengitystilana tulevaisuuksille”. Yksityisyyden puolestapuhujat ovat 
strategisen valintatilanteen edessä, jossa toisella puolella on valvontakäytäntöjen 
sääntelyn lisääminen ja toisella puolella valvonnan juurien kesyttäminen. 
ASIASANAT: tulevaisuudentutkimus, kriittinen tulevaisuudentutkimus, antisi-
paatio, kulttuurinen poliittinen taloustiede, yksityisyys, tietosuoja, institutionaalinen 
muutos  
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1 Introduction 
The future of privacy in the digital age is a curious issue. The backdrop to the current 
concern over privacy is formed by rapidly increasing technological affordances for 
creating, collecting and processing vast amounts of data, business practices that rely 
on massive data processing and increased interest in data-driven security due to fear 
of terrorist attacks and other shock events. The broader context is the debate around 
the so-called digital transformation, which is centred on artificial intelligence at the 
time of writing and is likely to have shifted somewhere else by the time this 
dissertation is published. The transformation is seen to provide novel opportunities 
but also threats ranging from individual harms to unforeseen concentrations of 
power, steepening inequalities and even existential threats to humanity. Following 
the discussion around privacy, as I have done, easily contributes to a kind of 
cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, if we believe some commentators, privacy is 
a crucial if not existential issue for civilised life in the years to come. In 2014, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report on the right 
to privacy in the digital age, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union recognises respect for private and family rights and protection of personal 
data as fundamental rights (European Union 2012; United Nations 2014). On the 
other hand, some commentators casually discuss life with little or no privacy, which 
may require adaptation but is certainly not dystopian. Individuals say they value their 
privacy but do little to protect it in practice (e.g. Barth and de Jong 2017). Privacy 
or protection from surveillance do not appear on lists of grand challenges such as the 
United Nations Agenda 2030 sustainable development goals or the Millennium 
Project’s 15 global challenges. 
Moreover, as a scholar concentrating on privacy issues, I often find myself at the 
other end of a tradeoff or balancing, usually with broadly shared values such as 
security, efficiency, transparency or personalised products and services. In this way, 
the privacy scholar has to indirectly oppose all these positive things, while defending 
what seems to be an individualistic and even selfish interest. Positioning privacy as 
the opposite end of a tradeoff gives it a kind of negative identity. 
In this dissertation, I develop a novel approach of critical-analytical futures 
studies, which enables studying the co-evolution of imaginaries and institutional 
Matti Minkkinen 
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change. This approach is operationalised for qualitative study using four stages: 
(historical) context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents (CASIL). Using critical-
analytical futures studies, I identify and study the central imaginaries in the European 
data protection reform, and identify latent possibilities for future privacy and discuss 
their potential and problematic aspects. In this way, this dissertation clarifies the 
contestation between different conceptions of privacy in the digital age, hopefully 
resolving some of the collective cognitive dissonance. I also position privacy as a 
positive prerequisite for a particular kind of future-oriented society, thus 
problematising its negative identity. The dissertation focuses on Europe and 
particularly the data protection reform in the European Union, because conceptions 
of privacy vary widely across cultures and political systems and because Europe is 
often seen as an influential arena in setting global privacy standards (Bennett and 
Raab 2018). 
The central problem is the future-oriented study of an important yet broad and 
ill-defined social phenomenon such as privacy. On the one hand, futures of privacy 
are influenced by numerous trends, processes and events. On the other hand, its 
future is likewise shaped by contestation over what privacy is and what it should be, 
as well as current ways of thinking about the future. Privacy protection is a social 
institution that is negotiated and contested by a set of actors in a path-dependent 
historical process. Given the systemic nature of privacy, the predominant ways of 
understanding and managing privacy are problematic. In particular, viewing privacy 
as a self-managed interest or an individual fundamental right may be inadequate for 
tackling systemic privacy issues in the digital age. Due to this continuous 
contestation, a model of change based on fixed driving forces is inadequate, and 
human agency, including the role of imagination and ideas, needs to be taken 
seriously. At the same time, action takes place within boundaries set by the historical 
situation. 
Keeping this complexity in mind, I argue for an understanding of privacy as 
breathing space for futures at the individual and societal level. The title of the 
dissertation is intentionally reflexive, that is, turned back on itself. While privacy 
enables breathing space for future-making, the current debate over privacy protection 
happens in the ‘breathless’ context of rapid datafication and de facto little privacy 
beyond the right to click “I agree”. The main problem under study is thus privacy for 
the future, not privacy in the future. Assessing technological and other trend-like 
threats to privacy remains important, but this area has already been covered by 
several projects (e.g. Ahonen et al. 2010; Auffermann et al. 2012; Guelke et al. 2013; 
Porcedda, Vermeulen, and Scheinin 2013). Another temptation is to start from the 
‘death of privacy’, which Richards (2015a) considers as a privacy myth. Bennett 
(2001) lists tens of books that discuss the “death of privacy” and the rise of 
surveillance, and John and Peters (2017) studied 101 newspaper articles between 
Introduction 
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1990 and 2012 declaring the end of privacy. Yet privacy continues to evolve despite 
its recurring death. A more interesting starting point than the death of privacy is 
qualitative change in privacy over time. 
The problem in this dissertation, then, is the present state of privacy and 
surveillance and how these influence future orientation rather than an impending 
dystopian world without privacy. Privacy is not simply another topic for future-
oriented enquiry. Instead, privacy is systemically linked to human future orientation, 
particularly its explorative and creative element, which enables imagining and 
making alternative futures that are not continuations of present trends and logics. 
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is the following. In the theoretical framework chapter, I 
outline the critical-analytical futures studies approach of the dissertation, drawing on 
critical futures studies, the causal mechanisms approach and cultural political 
economy. Then, I locate privacy as a social institution between three types of 
anticipation: anticipatory institutional change, predictive surveillance and 
anticipation in everyday life. In the methodology chapter, I present an approach to 
qualitatively studying institutional change based on four stages: context, actor 
storylines, imaginaries and latents. The synopsis chapter summarises the original 
studies and discusses their implications when taken together. In the discussion 
chapter, I identify and consider latent possibilities for future privacy understood as 
breathing space for futures as well as discussing policy implications and future 
research directions. In the conclusion, I return to the central problem and present 
more general conclusions particularly for critical futures studies. 
1.2 Aims and research questions 
The central aim of the dissertation is to understand privacy as a social and cultural 
phenomenon and understand change in privacy particularly from an anticipatory 
perspective, focusing on Europe. My dissertation is motivated by three central 
research questions, which are divided into subquestions: 
1. How can privacy be conceptualised from a systemic and future-oriented 
perspective? 
– How has privacy been defined from different perspectives? 
– What is an appropriate theoretical framework for understanding 
changes in privacy over time? 
– What kind of analytical approach is appropriate for studying privacy 
in a future-oriented manner? 
Matti Minkkinen 
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2. What is the role of anticipatory imaginaries in transforming the European 
privacy protection system? 
– What kinds of imaginaries exist in the privacy protection system? 
– What kinds of generic and specific anticipatory assumptions are 
embedded in the imaginaries? 
– How are imaginaries used by actors to influence change in privacy 
protection? 
3. What latent possibilities for future privacy can be identified in the privacy 
system? 
The research questions, empirical material and methods are divided across the 
summary and the original studies in the following way: 
Research questions, studies, empirical material and methods. 
Research question Study Empirical material Methods 
1. How can privacy be 
conceptualised from a systemic and 
future-oriented perspective? 
1, 
summary 
  
- How has privacy been defined 
from different perspectives? 
1 Literature Literature review 
- What is an appropriate theoretical 
framework for understanding 
changes in privacy over time? 
1, 
summary 
Literature Literature review 
2. What is the role of imaginaries in 
transforming the European privacy 
protection system? 
2, 3, 4, 5   
- What kinds of imaginaries exist in 
the privacy protection system? 
2, 3, 5 Focus group 
transcripts, 
document material 
Causal layered 
analysis, concept 
mapping 
- What kinds of generic and specific 
anticipatory assumptions are 
embedded in imaginaries? 
4, 5 Literature, 
document material 
Exploratory 
qualitative study 
- How are imaginaries used by 
actors to influence change in privacy 
protection? 
3 Document material Concept mapping 
3. What latent possibilities for future 
privacy can be identified in the 
privacy system? 
Summary Literature, material 
from the studies 
Cultural political 
economy 
 
This dissertation includes empirical studies but it deliberately emphasises theory, 
philosophy of science and methodology as opposed to data-driven methods. In the 
age of Big Data, vast materials of different kinds are available and this easily leads 
to a temptation to build scholarship inductively ‘from the data up’. Some contributors 
even argue for the obsolescence of theory at the face of data science (for a critique, 
see Mazzocchi 2015). However, I would argue that theory and philosophy of science 
Introduction 
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remain important if we are to understand how different types of data also produce 
social phenomena and change individuals rather than simply reflecting them, and if 
we are to critically study phenomena related to datafication rather than simply 
promoting it. 
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2 Theoretical Framework: Critical-
analytical Futures Studies and 
Cultural Political Economy 
Privacy as a social phenomenon evolves over time through changing cultural 
practices, technological affordances and values, but the shape of privacy protection 
is also continuously made in a complex system of actors, institutions and structural 
pressures. Moreover, like many social systems, this system is anticipatory, that is, 
capable of using the future to orient social practices in the present (Tuomi 2019). 
Potentially innumerable cultural, economic, technological, political and social 
factors influence the development of this system. To make sense of these dynamics 
and to locate anticipation and privacy in relation to one another, I will argue that 
three theoretical perspectives provide a fruitful combination: critical-analytical 
futures studies, which combines an emancipatory knowledge interest and focus on 
causal mechanisms, cultural political economy with a double focus on semiosis and 
structuration, and the anticipation perspective. 
Before going into substance, a note on terminology is in order. The theoretical 
framework uses the term ‘imaginaries’, which is not an established term in futures 
studies. ‘Image of the future’ and ‘futures images’ are more broadly utilised in the 
futures field (Bell and Mau 1971; Boulding 1963; Kuhmonen 2016; Polak 1973; Rubin 
2013). Bell and Mau (1971, 23) define an image of the future as “an expectation about 
the state of things to come at some future time” and explore their antecedents and 
effects for decision-making. However, after Bell and Mau’s initial setting of the 
research agenda, there has been relatively little development of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the ‘image of the future’ concept.1 At the same time, there has been 
a resurgence of interest in the concept of ‘imaginaries’ more broadly in the social 
sciences (e.g. Beckert 2013; Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Sum and Jessop 2013, ch. 4; 
Taylor 2004). Taylor (2004, 23) defines a social imaginary as “the ways people 
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
 
 
1  See, however, Kuhmonen’s discussion of futures images in the dynamics of complex 
adaptive systems (Kuhmonen 2016). 
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between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”. Taylor discusses 
rather fundamental imaginaries that underlie all social interaction and evolve over 
decades and centuries. Jasanoff and Kim (2015, 4) propose an explicitly future-
oriented concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, defined as “collectively held, 
institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated 
by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, 
and supportive of, advances in science and technology”. Sum and Jessop (2013, 165), 
in turn, define imaginaries as “semiotic systems that frame individual subjects’ lived 
experience of an inordinately complex world and/or inform collective calculation 
about that world”, noting that there are many kinds of imaginaries at different levels. I 
adopt this latter broad and pluralistic concept of imaginaries rather than Taylor’s more 
unitary approach or Jasanoff and Kim’s approach focused explicitly on desirable 
futures and technoscience. On the surface level, images of the future and imaginaries 
are similar concepts. However, the imaginary, broadly defined, is richer because an 
imaginary does not have to explicitly touch on the future but it nevertheless influences 
future outcomes. In this way, imaginaries highlight the imaginary relation to the 
complex social world more broadly rather than outlining discrete images of the future. 
2.1 Six paradigms of futures studies 
Futures research has matured into an interdisciplinary field with many approaches, 
methods and competing or complementary paradigms. Stabilisation and also 
fragmentation of the futures field have been identified as features of contemporary 
futures studies (Kuosa 2011; Son 2015). The field is grappling with increasing 
societal complexity that continues to challenge conventional methods that were 
developed during more stable times following the Second World War (Pang 2010). 
Son (2015) even claims that contemporary futures studies is experiencing an identity 
crisis. A simplified typology of futures studies paradigms is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Typology of futures studies paradigms. 
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Futures studies, foresight, scenario approaches and futures thinking in general have 
been divided into types in many different ways. Roy Amara’s (1981) division of the 
futures field into three basic goals, forming perceptions of the future (the possible), 
studying likely alternatives (the probable) and making choices in order to bring 
about a particular future (the preferable), continues to be influential. Around ten 
years later, alternative divisions into three paradigms have been suggested by 
Mannermaa (1991) (descriptive, scenario and evolutionary) and Inayatullah (1990) 
(predictive-empirical, cultural-interpretative and critical-poststructuralist). Tapio 
and Hietanen (2002) present a structured list of seven paradigms with different roles 
for professionals, decision-makers and the public. However, their approach is more 
generally aligned with planning-oriented futures studies. Co-evolutionary integral 
futures, which seeks to integrate levels of analysis, and participatory futures, which 
challenges expert-led ‘knowledge’ of the future, have been suggested as more recent 
paradigms (Hideg 2013). In a more general typology, these may be seen to fall under 
either critical or transformative approaches. Recently, Tuomi (2019) has also 
proposed a list of three approaches to foresight: probabilistic (forecasting), 
possibilistic (scenarios) and constructivist (design-based foresight) (cf. Poli 2017, 
1:67). While forecasting is data-driven, aiming at prediction accuracy, possibilistic 
scenario-based foresight is more oriented towards exploring uncertainties, increasing 
preparedness and devising resilient paths of action. Constructivist foresight, in turn, 
is expansive, explicitly aiming at increasing the space for action, realising latent 
opportunities and thus generating novel futures without explicitly representing them 
in full. The two first types are notably similar to social geographer Ben Anderson’s 
(2010) two types of anticipatory practices: calculating futures (extrapolation and 
inference based on trand analysis, modelling and data mining) and imagining futures 
(imagining, representing and narrating futures).2 In Figure 1, I adopt this threefold 
structure but suggest an additional dimension of normativity for further 
distinguishing between futures studies paradigms. Normative approaches aim 
explicitly to influence and change the future in some value-driven direction, while 
analytical approaches aim to explore and analyse possibilities. This does not mean 
that analytical approaches do not have normative underpinnings, but it means that 
the starting point of the analysis is explanation and understanding rather than active 
intervention. This added dimension yields six paradigms of futures studies: 
planning-oriented futures studies, predictive futures studies, visionary futures 
studies, explorative futures studies, critical-transformative futures studies and 
critical-analytical futures studies. Theoretical and methodological examples of each 
paradigm are given in Table 1. 
 
 
2  Anderson’s third category, performing futures (simulations, strategic games), is also 
interesting but it may be seen to fall under possibilistic approaches. 
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Table 1. Futures studies paradigms and examples. 
Paradigm Examples 
Calculative-
probabilistic 
 
Planning-oriented 
futures studies 
Backcasting (Dreborg 1996), roadmapping, normative scenarios (Börjeson 
et al. 2006), technocratic futures thinking (De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller 
2013), planning-oriented futures workshops 
Predictive futures 
studies 
Trend extrapolation, deterministic modelling, predictive analytics based on 
Big Data (Aradau and Blanke 2017), predictive scenarios (Börjeson et al. 
2006), problem-focused scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008), 
conventional and predictive futures thinking (De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller 
2013), probable futures (Amara 1981) 
Imaginative-
possibilistic 
 
Visionary futures 
studies 
Visionary futures thinking (De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller 2013), preferable 
futures (Amara 1981), visioning (van der Helm 2009), utopian approach 
(Masini 1993, 45), vision-oriented futures workshops 
Explorative 
futures studies 
Explorative scenarios (external and strategic) (Börjeson et al. 2006), 
scenario paradigm (Mannermaa 1991), alternative futures (Manoa School) 
(Dator 2009), intuitive logics scenarios (Wright, Bradfield, and Cairns 
2013), actor-centric scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008), intuitive and 
eventuality futures thinking (De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller 2013), possible 
futures (Amara 1981) 
Generative-
constructivist 
 
Critical-
transformative 
futures studies 
Evolutionary futures thinking (De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller 2013), 
critical/epistemological futures studies (Slaughter 2002), critical-
poststructuralist paradigm (Inayatullah 1990), identification of pioneers 
and frontrunners in transitions (de Haan and Rotmans 2018; Heinonen 
and Karjalainen 2019; Karjalainen and Heinonen 2018), reflexive 
interventionist multi-agent scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008), 
integral futures (Hideg 2013; Slaughter 2008), pathways (Sharpe et al. 
2016), transformation-oriented futures workshops, concrete utopias (e.g. 
Levitas 1990; Patomäki 2006) 
Critical-analytical 
futures studies 
Studies of the dynamics of images of the future (Bell and Mau 1971; Polak 
1973; Kaboli and Tapio 2017; Rubin and Linturi 2001), futures studies as 
non-predictive study of social change (Malaska 1999; Mannermaa 1991), 
anticipation studies as critical study of anticipation processes (Anderson 
2010; Poli 2017) 
 
In reality, the dividing lines between different approaches are seldom clear-cut. In 
particular, distinguishing between planning, visionary approaches and 
transformative approaches may be difficult and visioning workshops, for instance, 
may exhibit properties from all three. Nevertheless, it is useful to analytically 
distinguish between approaches emphasising rational planning, bold but achievable 
imaginative visioning and identifying transformative potential and seeds of change 
in the complex open present. Rather than a simple hierarchy, there are trade-offs 
between adopting different approaches. For instance, in policy foresight it may often 
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be desirable to stay relatively close to the calculative-probabilistic paradigm, while 
ensuring sufficient public participation and analytical rigour, to allow results to be 
understandable and useful to planners. However, significant social innovations are 
unlikely to be achieved with this strategy. 
The selection of research approach in any particular study should be guided by 
the nature of the phenomena under study, the aims of the study and the research 
questions. The complex systemic interconnectedness around privacy protection, the 
difficulty of defining privacy and the role of human imagination mean that a 
predictive perspective is not feasible, especially if we take learning and innovation 
seriously (Miller 2018b; Tuomi 2012). An exploratory scenario approach, drawing 
on the intuitive logics tradition, for instance, could yield interesting results, but 
scholarly scenarios without a focal actor or decision focus would risk being arbitrary, 
as there is no clear criterion for determining which factors are relevant, and they risk 
repeating statements from previous scenario studies (e.g. 6 1998a). Scenarios also 
typically examine structural driving forces, leaving less space for the role of human 
imagination and meaning-making in social change, apart from outlining trend-like 
shifts in values (Hughes 2013). 
2.2 The evolution of critical futures studies 
In this dissertation, I argue in favour of critical-analytical futures studies for 
studying complex social phenomena, taking into account both anticipatory 
assumptions and historical change processes. ‘Critical futures studies’ has been 
pioneered by Richard Slaughter (Slaughter 1982, 2003, 91–97), although it has since 
been superseded by integral futures in his thinking (Slaughter 2008). While integral 
futures studies usefully explores dynamics between several levels of analysis, it is 
not adopted here because the post-conventional stance to scholarship and extremely 
holistic ambitions make it more amenable to foresight practice and interventionist 
action research than empirical scholarship. Instead, I will argue for a more focused 
and analytical version of critical futures studies, not as a replacement to integral 
futures but as a complementary approach. 
In a nutshell, critical futures studies emphasises the investigation and critique of 
power relations, domination and foundational assumptions in envisioning and 
constructing futures, as well as developing social capacities to assert human purposes 
(Inayatullah 1990; Slaughter 1982, 148–54). According to Slaughter (2002, 504), 
“the ultimate purpose of futures work at this level is to open out productive mind-
spaces, to design in-depth social innovations and to prefigure more advanced stages 
of civilised life”. Critical futures studies can be seen to develop in partly overlapping 
waves. Ossip Flechtheim’s futurology was emancipatory from its beginnings in the 
1940s, with aims of democratisation and ending war and exploitation of humans and 
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nature. Flechtheim’s conception of futurology has been characterised as scientific 
and rationalist, with a specific notion of social progress that was rooted in a search 
for a third way between power blocs during the Cold War (Andersson 2018, 43–48). 
For Flechtheim, the future had to be freed from ideology and examined through 
critical social science (Andersson 2018, 46). 
The global systemic dimension of futures studies, exemplified by the Limits to 
Growth report and the formation of the World Futures Studies Federation in the 
1970s, can also be seen as the development of emancipatory, if not explicitly critical, 
futures studies (Ahlqvist and Rhisiart 2015). Andersson (2018, 47) characterises the 
“project of futures studies” as a form of counter-expertise to predictive futures work, 
the latter often associated with military planning during the Cold War. The new 
emancipatory futures studies, in contrast, was linked to new social movements such 
as the peace and environmental movements. Robert Jungk and Johan Galtung were 
central figures, and critical imagination was elevated as a new central value in 
addition to social scientific inquiry (Andersson 2018, ch. 8). 
Richard Slaughter was a pioneer in explicitly developing critical futures studies 
in the early 1980s. Slaughter’s formulation of critical futures studies focuses on two 
aspects: investigating worldviews and ways of knowing that frame our claims about 
futures, and emphasising the emancipatory potential of futures studies. This potential 
is limited by taken-for-granted social and economic structures that support certain 
kinds of futures work (Slaughter 1982, 134). For Slaughter, the revision of 
epistemological assumptions enables continuous re-negotiation of inherited 
meanings, emergent propositions and future potentials (Slaughter 1982, 149). 
Sohail Inayatullah (1990) interprets Slaughter’s critical futures studies to 
represent the search for a “true self” in line with the Enlightenment project. The 
underlying concept of emancipatory knowledge interest comes from the critical 
theorist Jürgen Habermas who distinguished it from the technical and practical 
knowledge interests. For Habermas, the emancipatory knowledge interest essentially 
means an interest in reflection and self-reflection to overcome domination and realise 
autonomy and responsibility (Habermas 1971, 53, 301–17). Inayatullah presents an 
alternative proposal for critical futures studies, drawing on the post-structuralist 
thought of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Michael Shapiro (Inayatullah 1990, 
1998). In this formulation, social reality is problematised and seen as the product of 
particular language use, historically evolving knowledge paradigms and regimes of 
truth. The re-negotiation of meanings, proposed by Slaughter, also becomes 
problematic because the “politics of meaning” continue to operate through language 
and discourse. The task of critical futures studies, then, is to make the present 
problematic and remarkable rather than seeking new shared meanings (Inayatullah 
1990). The debate between Inayatullah and Slaughter echoes the broader ‘Foucault–
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Habermas debate’ between Foucault’s notions of power and genealogy and 
Habermas’ communicative rationality (e.g. Kelly, Foucault, and Habermas 1994). 
Around the same time as Inayatullah’s post-structuralist notion of critical futures, 
Mika Mannermaa and Mika Pantzar were developing evolutionary futures research as 
an alternative to the descriptive and scenario paradigms (Mannermaa 1991; Pantzar 
1992). Evolutionary futures research begins from the concept of complexity, analyses 
mechanisms behind increasing complexity and argues that bifurcation points between 
stable phases provide emancipatory potential for futures studies (Mannermaa 1991; 
Pantzar 2017). This is somewhat similar to Slaughter’s notion of continuous re-
negotiation of meanings, although framed in terms of systems and complexity science. 
Like Slaughter, Mannermaa argues that futures studies should have a clear 
emancipatory knowledge interest: “it should help people to free themselves from old 
lines of thought and to create new ideas” (p. 364). The ontological reality of 
complexity and the epistemological orientation towards emancipation can be seen to 
provide complementary arguments in favour critical futures studies. 
Many of the same emphases as in critical futures studies, such as focus on 
complexity, anticipatory assumptions and a deeper investigation of societal reality, 
have re-emerged in the ‘anticipation studies’ approach (e.g. Poli 2017). Recent 
contributions in this line of thinking call to reflect on assumptions about the future 
in habits and techniques of thinking in addition to content, and question how we 
could relate differently to the future (Anderson 2010; Miller 2011). To some extent, 
anticipation studies is a continuation of French futures studies (la prospective) and 
critical futures studies, but its ambition is broader, arguably to ‘futurise’ social 
sciences as well as natural sciences (Poli 2017, Ch. 1). The critical futures studies 
and anticipation traditions necessitate ‘turning inwards’ and focusing on how 
phenomena are framed instead of mapping and forecasting external trends and their 
interactions. In this sense, they bring the foresight actors into the frame, explicitly 
investigating the anticipatory assumptions that underlie statements about futures 
(Miller 2018b). Such framing assumptions are present in futures thinking in any case, 
and they should be made the explicit focus of attention in order to provide more 
transparency and reflexivity to anticipatory practices. However, anticipation studies 
authors do not explicitly position their work in relation to critical and emancipatory 
futures studies, which makes tracing intellectual links somewhat difficult. Moreover, 
the normative and political implications of anticipation studies are largely left 
undeveloped, although some authors have discussed these issues in particular 
contexts such as education (e.g. Amsler and Facer 2017) 
Recently, there have been calls for rejuvenating critical futures studies as an 
alternative to mainstream strategy or policy-oriented futures work (cf. Son 2015, 130). 
Ahlqvist and Rhisiart (2015) argue strongly in favour of critical futures research as a 
complement to instrumentalist futures studies and foresight. They present three 
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potential pathways for critical futures: construction of futures through sociotechnical 
practices, future-oriented dialectics and socio-economic imaginaries in the 
construction of futures. This study essentially takes up the third path, investigating 
discourses, practices and imaginaries in change processes through cultural political 
economy (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). However, Ahlqvist and Rhisiart (2015) link 
critical futures studies to behaviour change and futures knowledge, both of which are 
problematic. They argue that the emancipatory dimension enables revealing meta-
level knowledge that changes human behaviour towards a more sustainable direction 
(p. 95). They further argue for a dialectical process that could produce “more in-depth 
futures knowledge” as a synthesis (p. 97). While the intended behaviour change is 
towards increased critical self-reflection, the framing of changing external behaviour, 
as opposed to Slaughter’s negotiation of meanings, has undertones of control over 
futures. Futures knowledge, in turn, is a problematic concept for critical futures studies. 
Arguably critical futures work does not aim to produce knowledge about futures, but 
instead to problematise current, historically specific, knowledge and practices and thus 
enable alternative futures to emerge. 
Goode and Godhe (2017), in turn, argue for politically charged critical futures 
studies for studying “the scope and constraints within public culture for imagining and 
debating different potential futures”, contributing to a “futural public sphere”. They 
usefully question strong constructivism and remind futurists about contingency, 
emergence, competition among several competing discourses and the limits of 
‘steering history’ in this context. These themes are also explored in this dissertation. 
2.3 Critical-analytical futures studies, causal 
mechanisms and projects 
In relation to previous developments of critical futures studies, I propose two important 
points to take the field forward. We need to historicise the concept of emancipation 
and, related to this, incorporate the critical realist notion of social mechanisms into the 
critical futures project. The concept of emancipation has been central in critical futures 
studies since the beginning. In the critical futures tradition, one key concern is 
‘colonisation’ of the future, which means locking many parts of the world as well as 
future generations into futures planned by a narrow set of decision-makers or 
visionaries (Inayatullah 1990; Sardar 1999). As Riel Miller (2018b, 21) puts it, in this 
closed type of anticipation, “the imperative is to colonise tomorrow with today’s idea 
of tomorrow”. Adam and Groves (2007, 13) state that “our own present is our 
predecessors’ empty and open future: their dreams, desires and discoveries, their 
imaginations, innovations and impositions, their creations”, which means that the 
consequences of our ‘empty’ futures will also be inescapably real for future 
generations. The emancipatory agenda of critical futures studies then means revealing 
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colonisation by particular imaginaries and decolonising the future, thus increasing 
scope for human agency. The key challenge is how to retain agency, including the 
invention of previously unimagined novelty, in the context of complexity and radical 
uncertainty without colonising or trying to control the future (Miller 2010; Wilkinson 
and Eidinow 2008). Critical futures studies and the anticipation approach mark a shift 
away from both deterministic forecasting and exploratory or visionary scenario 
approaches. The aim is to generate futures, broaden future alternatives, rather than 
claiming to know the future or a discrete set of alternatives (Poli 2017). 
However, by focusing on assumptions and worldviews behind current futures 
thinking, critical futures studies and the anticipation approach risk losing the 
processual focus that is central to other types of futures research, which investigate 
trends, weak signals and other drivers of change. Turning inward risks removing 
temporality and historicity from futures studies. While studying present anticipatory 
assumptions is necessary, it is also important to be able to situate them in broader 
change processes that include structural and material factors as well as the interplay 
of numerous future imaginaries. This way futures studies can study processes of 
negotiation over futures in addition to taking part in them. 
In this historical perspective, the meaning of emancipation is broader than simply 
freedom from epistemological limitations such as inherited worldviews and 
assumptions. Critical theory, stemming from the Frankfurt School, is a broad and 
open-ended emancipatory project that positions phenomena in historical context, 
critically disputes existing social realities that are produced by specific interests and 
power relations, and suggests the possibility of different social conditions through 
dialectical negation (Ahlqvist and Rhisiart 2015, 95; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 
144).  From the Habermasian perspective, this means enabling rational 
communication free from domination, such as the re-negotiation of meanings 
promoted by Richard Slaughter. However, this epistemological notion of 
emancipation is too narrow, reducing critique to uncovering presuppositions and 
proposing that other ways of thinking are possible, or to freeing humans from any 
kinds of constraints (Sayer 2009). A deeper and more historical notion of 
emancipation cannot avoid questions of structured inequalities, power relationships, 
including economic power, and normative questions about human flourishing. The 
aim of more substantively critical and emancipatory social science is to critique 
injustice and avoidable suffering, and to promote human flourishing (Sayer 2009). 
This substantive approach to emancipation is theoretically supported by the 
capability approach developed by Nussbaum and Sen, which is also referenced by 
authors within anticipation studies (Miller 2018b; Poli 2017, 1:247–52). Capabilities 
are “substantial liberties” that provide opportunities for choosing and acting, such as 
physical and psychological integrity and literacy (Poli 2017, 1:248–49). Neither 
injustices nor capabilities necessary for flourishing can be exhaustively listed, but 
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the key insight is that humans and other species are capable of suffering and 
flourishing, and emancipatory social science should reduce suffering and promote 
flourishing. The substantive and historical notion of emancipation is, of course, 
nothing new in futures studies: it was already central to Ossip Flechtheim’s 
futurology. It is also in line with Eleonora Masini’s notion of seeds of change in the 
historical process (Masini 2006) and Wendell Bell’s substantive formulation of the 
mission of futures studies: “to maintain and improve the well-being of humankind 
and the life-sustaining capacities of the Earth” (Bell 2003, 158). 
Importantly, injustices and forms of suffering are historically changing and 
linked to particular contexts. Emancipatory social science can only have a limited 
role in promoting flourishing because it is conditioned by social practices outside 
itself (Bhaskar 2014, 174). In terms of integrating historical processes to futures 
studies, Mika Mannermaa’s and Mika Pantzar’s evolutionary futures studies and the 
focus on long waves in the economy provide inspiring examples of futures studies 
as the study of socioeconomic change (Mannermaa 1991; Pantzar 2017; Wilenius 
and Kurki 2017). Anita Rubin’s analytical work on images of the future and changes 
in values is also relevant (Rubin and Linturi 2001). However, discussing societal 
development in terms of macro-level phases risks neglecting the numerous 
negotiations and struggles that take place on the micro level and particularly on the 
meso level of institutions and imaginaries. Richard Slaughter’s transformative cycle, 
which outlines a continuous cycle of breakdowns of meaning, re-conceptualisations, 
negotiations and conflicts and selective legitimation, also serves as inspiration for 
considering social change in a way that also considers changes in cultural meanings 
(Slaughter 2004). The model usefully indicates the negotiation and selectivity 
involved in sociocultural change, but it is presented as a tool for workshops, 
development processes and cultural criticism rather than a model or theory of social 
change (Slaughter 2004, 17). Therefore, additional perspectives are needed to 
develop critical-analytical futures studies. 
In the following, I argue that two types of causality are useful for critical-
analytical futures studies that studies both anticipatory assumptions and historical 
processes. First, for the analytical part, the recent move in social sciences towards 
causal mechanisms provides an opportunity to combine critical futures studies with 
a processual and evolutionary view. Causal mechanisms are differentiated from the 
traditional covering-law explanations and statistical regularities by indicating the 
“cogs and wheels”, the entities, actions and relations, of the causal process through 
which outcomes are produced (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). In futures studies, 
focusing primarily on efficient causes and causation between abstract macro-level 
factors tends to lead to determinism and consideration of particular ill-defined 
external shocks as causes of change (Derbyshire and Wright 2017). Even though 
focal actors may be seen to exhibit limited agency, broader social systems are often 
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implicitly seen as following a trajectory determined by presently visible driving 
forces (Tuomi 2019). Causal mechanisms, in contrast, are local in that they explain 
spatiotemporally restricted processes rather than statistical regularities or 
development seen through general system variables (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). 
In particular, qualitative research, which captures unfolding meaning-making 
processes, is compatible with mechanism-based theoretical accounts (Tavory and 
Timmermans 2014, 97). Nevertheless, similar types of mechanisms, such as self-
fulfilling prophecies, may explain outcomes in different cases (Hedström and 
Bearman 2009, 6–7). In principle, mechanism-based explanations require empirical 
evidence to provide plausible analytical explanations for each link and rigorous 
checking of each assumption. In practice, futures researchers are typically interested 
in broad macro-level phenomena and thus will need to balance between rigour and 
comprehensiveness. Mannermaa’s (1991) evolutionary futures studies, for instance, 
is rather broad in scope, making it difficult to identify and justify particular 
mechanisms, and thus the meso level of specific institutions and collective action 
may be a fruitful starting point for analyses. Mechanism-based explanations are 
foundational for the recent approach of analytical sociology. However, analytical 
sociology has thus far mostly examined micro-level mechanisms related to 
individuals’ behaviour, although links to historical sociology examining large-scale 
processes have also been suggested (Barkey 2009; Hedström and Bearman 2009). 
Crucially, the mechanism-based approach precludes prediction when social 
action is involved, because “the same mechanisms can produce different outcomes 
in different circumstances” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 56). The focus on causal 
mechanisms therefore needs to be distinguished from the conception of deterministic 
mechanistic systems, which are in fact rare and exclude all living systems and human 
societies (Tuomi 2019). Unpredictability means that mechanism-based futures 
research is strictly speaking not about the future, or indeed futures, but about 
understanding present structures and anticipatory assumptions and identifying 
contingent possibilities in the present. 
The causal mechanism approach is often connected with the critical realist 
position on philosophy of science, notably promoted by the British philosopher Roy 
Bhaskar (Bhaskar 2014; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). The ontological critical 
realism of Bhaskar and others should be distinguished from the epistemological 
critical realism promoted by Wendell Bell for futures studies. The latter attempts to 
epistemologically steer between positivism and post-positivism while Bhaskarian 
critical realism is more concerned with social ontology and justificable forms of 
causality (Bell 1997; Bhaskar 2014). Critical realism in Bhaskar’s sense is rather 
complex and employs specialist vocabulary such as ‘generative mechanisms’ and 
‘causal powers’, and it is not fruitful to explore this philosophical basis in depth in 
this dissertation. However, it is interesting to note that closeness to critical realism 
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unites the cultural political economy approach discussed below (Sum and Jessop 
2013), recent contributions to the philosophical basis of futures studies (Patomäki 
2006; Poli 2011) and the causal mechanisms approach. 
In order to maintain the emancipatory element in critical-analytical futures studies, 
that is, reduction of injustice and avoidable suffering and promotion of flourishing, 
another type of causality is also necessary: the future-oriented projects that motivate 
human actors. Eleonora Masini has discussed the importance of understanding actors’ 
projects for futures studies, distinguishing this from both predictive and utopian 
approaches (Masini 1989). More recently sociologists have drawn on Alfred Schütz’s 
conception of projects to emphasise projectivity as a key element of human agency 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Mische 2009). While causal mechanisms help to 
understand the structural conditions and the process of events, considering future-
oriented and value-driven projects of human actors as well as the interplay of many 
such projects is also necessary to give a richer account of social events that also 
considers human agency. Projects can be characterised as the final causes of future 
outcomes (Derbyshire and Wright 2017). In line with the historical emancipatory 
approach, the normative standpoint of critical-analytical futures studies should be 
(critical) commitment to emancipatory projects, in the plural, rather than committing 
to the perspective of any single social actor or to a specific image of the future such as 
a precisely specified ‘sustainable future’. As Masini (2006, 1166) states, “projects for 
and of the future must be many, reflecting different values and appreciated for their 
diversity. […] Futures projects are political and ethical positions that lead to action.”3 
It is important to analytically distinguish the imagined futures of various actors and 
the future that emerges as the result of their systemic interaction. Actors and coalitions 
promote different projects, but the resulting outcome may not be intended by any 
single actor. Institutional change and design may then be intentional, driven by goals, 
values and objectives, but not purposive, leading to a fully predicted outcome (Lewis 
and Steinmo 2012). Agency-oriented approaches in transition studies discuss similar 
issues, but the direction of desired change is relatively clear for sustainability 
transitions, which allows to identify pioneers and frontrunners (de Haan and Rotmans 
2018; Heinonen and Karjalainen 2019; Karjalainen and Heinonen 2018). In contrast, 
it is less clear who are pioneers in the context of privacy. 
2.4 Cultural political economy 
Admittedly, the notions of causal mechanisms and actors’ intentional projects come 
from different theoretical lineages, and their combination raises the perennial 
 
 
3  The broader project is to ensure the kind of society that enables multiple future-oriented 
projects and the freedom to discuss alternative futures (Bell 1997, 74). 
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challenge of structure and agency. Causal mechanisms point towards the importance 
of structures, while studying actors’ projects emphasises the agency of relatively 
free-willed actors. The framework of cultural political economy provides several 
useful analytical tools for bridging this gap and understanding structural conditions 
and actors’ strategic opportunities. Cultural political economy (CPE) is an 
interdisciplinary social scientific approach that begins from the principle of 
complexity reduction (Sum and Jessop 2013). The social world and social practices 
cannot be comprehended in all their complexity, which means that selection is 
necessary for social actors to ‘go on’, but selection may take many different forms. 
In particular, the cultural political economy framework provides three useful sets of 
conceptual tools. The first tool is the strategic-relational approach to institutions by 
which the CPE approach attempts to bridge the perennial structure-agency divide in 
social sciences. Rather than discussing external constraints (structure) and free-
willed actions (agency), the CPE approach considers “structurally inscribed strategic 
selectivity” and “strategically calculated structurally oriented action” (Sum and 
Jessop 2013, 50). The terminology is admittedly somewhat complicated, but it 
usefully recognises how certain structures such as organisational forms selectively 
privilege certain types of agents and action, and conversely how actors may utilise 
(or not utilise) these contextual opportunities when selecting a course of action, 
depending on their capacities (Sum and Jessop 2013, 49). Importantly, structures are 
not viewed as fixed but as historically evolving. 
The second conceptual tool is the distinction between two modes of complexity 
reduction in social practices: sensemaking (semiosis), which produces sedimented 
meanings, discourses and imaginaries, and structuration, which produces 
institutionalised social forms (Sum and Jessop 2013, 148–60). Semiosis refers to 
continuous sensemaking and meaning-making at different levels, where phenomena 
are fitted into simpler frameworks to comprehend them. Similar semiotic practices 
occur in many fields: everyday life, scholarship, policymaking and so on, and they 
include both situational meanings and shared cultural codes that transcend particular 
situations. Norton (2014) sums up the importance of shared meanings: “cultural 
systems, understood as the set of relevant conventions of meaning, are the 
preeminent technique people use to figure out what is going on and who one is in a 
situation and to map their courses of action”. Complexity reduction through semiosis 
seems close to Peirce’s semiotics and abductive reasoning, where individuals are 
seen to continuously and creatively redefine actions and situations (Tavory and 
Timmermans 2014, 140). Sum and Jessop (2013, 4) state that their approach is close 
to the Peirce’s pragmatic tradition but not located within it. However, in discussing 
semiotics (Sum and Jessop 2013, Ch. 3), they do not elaborate their relationship to 
the pragmatic tradition. 
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Structuration, in turn, means the contingent reproduction and transformation of 
social systems in the continuous interaction among social actors. Like cultural systems, 
institutional rules internalised as inter-subjective schemas also make meaningful social 
interaction possible: “Because individuals’ attention and cognitive capacity are 
limited, humans rely heavily on such ‘schemas.’ […] [T]hey are a coherent set of 
interrelated propositions that inform one’s view of how the world works, one’s goals, 
and the means of achieving them” (Lewis and Steinmo 2012). Here, frameworks from 
historical institutionalism such as Mahoney and Thelen’s (2009) theory of gradual 
institutional change are useful for bringing rigour to structuration analysis. Historical 
institutionalism is discussed below in the next section. 
It is interesting to compare cultural political economy with causal layered 
analysis (CLA), since CLA is perhaps the best-known critical futures method. Causal 
layered analysis, based on a post-structuralist philosophy of science, tends to 
prioritise the semiotic and linguistic dimension, by considering ‘social causes’ as one 
layer of meaning that is based on fundamental myths and metaphors (Inayatullah 
1998). In CLA, the ‘real’ is conceptualised as discursive and layered (Inayatullah 
1990, 1998) while in CPE the ‘real’ is assumed to exist partly outside discourse but 
social actors have no direct access to it. The myth/metaphor layer in causal layered 
analysis investigates one instance of sensemaking: comprehending complex 
phenomena through cultural myths and cognitive metaphors. CLA is also a practical 
method to promote investigation of broader futures by taking distance from the 
present, and as such it can be seen as an intervention into the semiosis and 
structuration processes that CPE studies. While intended as dynamic, the CLA 
method as such does not include any explicit consideration of temporal sequences 
where different worldviews interact over time. Causal layered analysis is perhaps 
most appropriate as a tool for analysing imaginaries in depth and for promoting novel 
possible futures based on metaphors, and it can be complemented with other tools 
such as CPE for outlining the mechanisms of institutional and cultural change. 
Finally, the third conceptual tool is the distinction between four modes of 
strategic selectivity: structural, discursive, technological and agential (Sum and 
Jessop 2013, 214–19). These condition the co-evolution of imaginaries and 
institutions in different ways. Structural selectivity means the constraints and 
opportunities to action provided by prevailing social structures such as existing 
institutions. Discursive selectivity refers to the constraints and opportunities in 
semiotic orders such as imaginaries, established discourses and text genres. 
Prevailing discourses may restrict which statements are imaginable and intelligible, 
who is authorised to state them and how they can be connected to broader discourses. 
Technological selectivity combines structural and discursive features in more 
comprehensive “knowledging technologies” such as dominant strategic logics and 
regimes of truth, visible for instance in credible scientific disciplines. Finally, 
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agential selectivity refers to the capacities of agents to strategically calculate their 
approach in particular situations (Sum and Jessop 2013, 214–19). 
Semiosis and structuration produce path-dependent societal developments as 
well as path-breaking semiotic and social innovations. Semiotic and structural 
changes co-evolve through three general evolutionary mechanisms: continuous 
variation in discourses and practices, selection of certain discourses and practices to 
make sense of phenomena and retention of certain discourses and practices in 
routines, institutional rules, ways of talking and so on (Sum and Jessop 2013, 184–
85).4 Lewis and Steinmo (2012) also argue for the role of continuous variation 
produced by advanced cognitive capacities in institutional change: “In constantly 
generating new variation upon which mechanisms of selection and replication 
operate, cognition, cognitive schemas, and ideas become central for understanding 
the building of human institutions, as well as the scope and pace of their evolution”. 
Discourses that are merely used by actors for sensemaking are construals (or “mere 
fantasies” in Alfred Schütz’s terms), while putting them into practice makes them 
constructions with potentially transformative effects (or “design fantasies”) (Beckert 
2013; Sum and Jessop 2013, 162). This distinction, although rarely explicitly stated, 
is crucial in futures studies, since it denotes the difference between disconnected 
scenarios or images of the future and future-oriented action on the basis of such 
imaginaries. For Poli (2017, 1:67), this direct action orientation distinguishes 
anticipation from foresight. 
2.5 Towards an anticipatory cultural political 
economy: anticipatory institutional change and 
latent possibilities 
In sum, cultural political economy offers a theoretical vocabulary that can be 
operationalised and is broader than domain-specific terms. However, the framework 
does not explicitly consider anticipation and futures. Thus one option would be to 
turn to Jasanoff and Kim’s sociotechnical imaginaries as images of desirable futures 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2015). However, a more interesting option is to consider 
imaginaries as anticipatory, pointing towards futures, even though they may not 
explicitly contain representations of (desirable) futures. Poli (2017, 1:52) makes an 
analytical distinction between representational and presentational anticipation. The 
former contains explicit ideas about futures while in the latter, futures are embedded 
in action and practices. A possible third type is imaginaries that contain beliefs about 
 
 
4  The authors also provide a more elaborate set with two additional mechanisms 
(reinforcement and selective recruitment) but they mostly utilise this set of three 
mechanisms. 
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the world, about the roles of human actors, about causality and so on (cf. Bell and 
Mau 1971; Taylor 2004). They are representations but not explicitly about futures. 
Many authors have made some kind of distinction between more explicit, 
intentional foreground discourses and underlying imaginaries. In causal layered 
analysis, the litany level represents the manifest content of discourses, while the 
underlying layers point to a deeper myth, worldview or imaginary (Inayatullah 
1998).5 Drawing on CLA, Miedziński (2018) suggests analysing policy narratives 
by reconstructing their storylines and then investigating their deeper narrative 
frames, including cognitive and normative determinants. Lewis and Steinmo (2012) 
distinguish between ideas (conscious, creative solutions) and schemas (unconscious 
cognitive rules) on the individual level. Schmidt (2008), in turn, distinguishes 
between foreground policy ideas and programmatic ideas, and underlying 
philosophical ideas that are rarely contested, and also between foreground discursive 
abilities and background ideational abilities. In a similar way, Tavory and Eliasoph 
(2013) discuss narrative trajectories/projects (shared stories about where actors are 
going) and temporal landscapes. The latter are naturalised ways of organising time 
that are rarely explicitly discussed unless their stability is challenged. For 
understanding anticipatory multi-actor dynamics, I would then argue for 
distinguishing between actor storylines and anticipatory imaginaries. The former 
are explicit narratives with a similar way of making sense of a complex world that 
are used to persuade others and form discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993, 47–48). The 
latter concern different actors’ underlying relationships to the future but they are 
usually not explicitly articulated and they need not be explicit images of the future. 
Cultural political economy seems to be compatible with the theory of 
anticipatory systems, since both involve complexity reduction as a necessary 
prerequisite for action. Anticipatory agents formulate simplified models of their 
environment to guide their future-oriented action (Louie 2010). CPE makes a useful 
distinction between two types of models: imaginaries, which are ‘sedimented’ 
semiotic orders, and institutions, which likewise represent crystallisations of 
continuous societal processes (cf. Mahoney and Thelen 2009). In-depth 
philosophical discussion and synthesis of the two frameworks is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
The key point is that institutional change is an anticipatory process because the 
imaginaries employed by actors point towards futures. Historical and discursive 
institutionalism provide conceptual tools for understanding institutional change, which 
I will argue to be useful for developing an anticipatory approach to institutional change 
 
 
5  In an earlier paper, Inayatullah points to Donald Michael’s and Walter Truett 
Anderson’s argument for investigating stories, larger structures of meaning, instead of 
scenarios understood as playful exploratory devices (Inayatullah 1990). 
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and cultural political economy. In historical institutionalism, institutions are seen as 
contingent and evolving settlements of power dynamics between actors (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2009). Discursive institutionalism, in turn, highlights the role of ideas and 
political philosophies in institutional change (Schmidt 2008). However, the 
anticipatory orientation of institutional change has received little explicit attention. 
While rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism consider the 
material interests of actors and discursive policy analysis studies discourse coalitions, 
the anticipatory projects that motivate them are not explicitly examined (Hajer 1993; 
Hall and Taylor 1996; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Conversely, in the futures field, 
political and institutional dimensions are often lacking, and in particular, gradual 
evolutionary institutional change processes that involve changes in cognition and 
framing are rarely discussed (Nilsson et al. 2011). This is understandable because it 
greatly increases complexity: not only are there alternative futures, there are alternative 
ways of framing the focal issues, which in turn influence institutional change. An 
anticipatory approach to institutional change is important because institutions are not 
only developed based on causal factors from the past or interpretations of the present 
but also looking forward into imagined and planned futures, with future-oriented actors 
and projects playing a key role. 
The future-oriented study of institutions means studying the continuous 
negotiation processes and struggles over plausible future imaginaries that may then 
become institutionalised in social structures. In the futures field, there is a long 
tradition of research into images of the future and their role in societal development, 
starting from Kenneth Boulding’s and Frederik Polak’s works on the role of the 
images of the future in societal development, and continued in Wendell Bell’s 
‘cybernetic-decisional model’ of the systemic antecedents and effects of images of 
the future and Anita Rubin’s studies on young people’s images of the future during 
times of social transition (Bell and Mau 1971; Boulding 1963; Polak 1973; Rubin 
2013). Bell (1997) identifies the study of images of the future as one of the tasks of 
futures studies. However, only recently scholars have explicitly studied the ‘ecology’ 
and coordination involving numerous anticipatory actors with different images of 
the future (Michael 2017; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013). As van Lente (2012) states, 
socio-technical developments are “saturated with formal and informal 
anticipations”, where explicit foresight may only be the tip of the iceberg. 
For understanding systemic developments, it is important to draw attention to 
causal mechanisms that explain how changes in institutional rules and structures are 
produced through interacting factors (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). There are 
continuous processes of societal contestation and negotiation over plausible futures, 
which may take different forms in different contexts, but the general outline remains 
similar. It is important to notice that ‘the negotiation process’ is an abstraction that 
actually consists of innumerable local sites of contestation, negotiation and struggle 
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around specific aspects of the future. Models of policy cycles with agenda setting, 
decision-making and implementation are one example of such negotiations. The 
numerous local negotiations may exhibit general patterns, what Tavory and Eliasoph 
(2013) call trajectories (shared narratives that give meaning to action) and they take 
place against the ‘temporal landscape’ (widely shared views on structuring time, 
such as weekly calendars). The diversity of views vary in different negotiation 
processes, from an emphasis on one shared vision to countless heterogeneous 
perspectives (Tuomi 2019). Actors’ future-oriented projects are important but the 
outcome of the contestation may differ from any actor’s project. 
Because no actor usually dominates the institutional change process, negotiating 
plausibility is a central mechanism. Imaginaries and discourses remain only construals 
in Sum and Jessop’s (2013) terms unless they take root and influence the construction 
of institutions. Here, discursive, structural and technological factors and strategic 
action together work to select certain options and exclude others (Sum and Jessop 
2013, ch. 5). Plausibility may then be seen as a particular kind of discursive selectivity, 
which entails that imaginaries are meaningful and viable from the perspective of key 
actors, such as policymakers, with particular sensemaking frames. Importantly, 
narratives need to have practical credibility in addition to inherent convincingness 
(Beckert 2013). Here I adopt van der Helm’s (2006, 24) concept of plausibility as a 
purely subject-related notion that refers to “concepts of judgment and conviction, to 
argument and the process of being convinced”. In other words, plausibility relates to 
negotiations, sensemaking and reasoning, not to the objective possibility or probability 
of the described future state, which is often unknowable in advance. This differs from 
the common conception of plausible futures as a subset of possible futures. 
The notion of negotiating plausibility challenges a conception of strictly rational 
and evidence-based decision-making. What is plausible to key actors is not only 
defined by facts but arguably also by ethics, values, worldviews and even aesthetic 
considerations of what are appropriate, elegant or ‘ugly’ solutions (Eidinow and 
Ramirez 2016). There is a paradox related to the plausibility of imaginaries. If an 
imaginary is highly plausible, it is also unlikely to challenge the status quo and 
promote change. On the other hand, if an imaginary is highly challenging to the 
status quo, it is unlikely to be widely perceived as plausible and therefore has limited 
effect (Ramírez and Selin 2014). We can hypothesise that effective imaginaries 
skilfully combine existing discourses and stretch the limits of plausibility to promote 
novel social practices. Power relations among actors may also be highly unequal in 
negotiations. The institutional and economic positions of the actors that discuss 
futures are likely to influence perceptions of plausibility. The different ways in which 
power plays out in negotiations on plausibility is an important topic for future work. 
In temporal terms, negotiation processes include opening phases where 
institutional rules are opened to questioning and new actors are included in the 
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discussion (den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen 2014), and even crises and 
‘hyperprojective’ phases when different understandings of the future are made 
explicit and brought forth as objects of conscious reflection (Jessop and Oosterlynck 
2008; Mische 2014). Mische argues that by analysing futures talk in sites of 
hyperprojectivity, “we can understand the mechanisms by which future projections 
affect decisions, relations, and institutions” (Mische 2014). The three mechanisms 
of variation, selection and retention provide a useful simplification of these 
mechanisms (Sum and Jessop 2013, 184–85). 
Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008) emphasise economic, social and political crises 
as conducive to alternative projects and visions as well as attempts at reasserting the 
dominant order, and their outcomes are not deterministic.6 Depending on the actor 
perspective, crises are catastrophes or windows of opportunity. The public 
consultations on the EU General Data Protection Regulation, studied in Minkkinen 
(2019a), may be seen as one opening phase, if not a crisis. 
Anticipatory CPE then provides a temporal frame for critical-analytical futures 
studies by investigating the co-evolution of imaginaries and institutions. However, 
since critical futures studies and the causal mechanism approach posit that prediction 
is generally impossible in social systems, the problem of futurity remains. Does the 
‘future’ only mean the future horizons of actors or can we say something about 
possible future outcomes of actions? I would argue that the framework allows 
provisional identification of latent possibilities. Theorists within futures studies, 
philosophy and the social sciences have considered similar notions but have given 
them somewhat different names. For instance, Masini (2006) discusses “seeds of 
change” in the process of history, while Bell (1997, 76) discusses “real potentials 
within things” and “the futures that could be” as well as “dispositions”. In The 
Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch discusses several types of possibility, the most 
relevant here being “possibility according to the object”, which means potential that 
is hidden in the structure of an object, which may be either active evolutionary 
potential or passive, requiring human intervention to become reality (van der Helm 
2006; cf. Poli 2017, 1:88–93). Poli (2011), in turn, discusses five provisional 
categories of latents: dispositions, seeds of the future, and three kinds of constraints 
(social relations, levels of reality and worldviews/myths). There is an interesting 
parallel here to the four selectivities in cultural political economy. Patomäki (2006, 
 
 
6  Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) similarly argue that critical junctures are decisive 
breakpoints in path-dependent development. The concepts of tipping points and 
bifurcations are also similar (e.g. Mannermaa 1991). Slaughter (1982, 153) likewise 
argued for three broad phases in critical futures: analysis of breakdown of inherited 
meanings, reconceptualisation via new paradigms and negotiation and selective 
legitimation of new meanings. 
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14) states that “[r]eal possibilities are not exhausted by actualised or empirically 
observable possibilities”, while Miller (2010, 74) mentions identifying “emergent 
traces of both endogenous and exogenous change in anticipatory systems”, which 
may be “hidden by the filters of the dominant paradigm”. Adam and Groves (2007, 
17, 122) discuss “latent futures in the making”, which are living in the present and 
on their way to emergence. Sum and Jessop (2013, x) note that semiosis may refer 
to “as-yet-unrealized possibilities”. The distinction in CPE between semiotic 
(sensemaking) and structural/institutional factors is useful for considering future 
potential. Future potentials and potential pathways thus reside in the opportunities 
provided by the co-evolution of particular imaginaries and institutions. However, in 
open systems we cannot predict which sets of potentials will actualise and we cannot 
simply assume which pathways could emerge. 
Based on the previous discussion, critical-analytical futures studies could be 
summarised with the following definition: critical-analytical futures studies 
investigates the relationships between anticipation, semiosis, structuration and latent 
possibilities in particular spatiotemporal contexts. The elements of critical-analytical 
futures studies are illustrated visually in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Elements of critical-analytical futures studies. 
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3 Locating Privacy as a Systemic 
and Anticipatory Phenomenon 
This chapter discusses the meaning of privacy for anticipation and future orientation. 
Using the critical-analytical futures studies framework presented in the previous 
chapter, I will argue below that privacy occupies a position at the intersection of 
three types of anticipatory practices: anticipatory institutional change, predictive 
surveillance practices and everyday anticipation. In other words, privacy is not 
simply another topic for future-oriented study, but it is conceptually linked to 
anticipation. This means that changing privacy rules also changes the way futures 
are made. It should be noted that a similar argument could be made for many topics: 
different energy systems and housing policies, for instance, may also change 
anticipatory practices. This makes futures studies an inherently reflexive field that 
needs to examine its own influence on phenomena and its co-evolution with them. 
In the following, this reflexive attention will be turned to privacy as an anticipatory 
phenomenon. 
3.1 Privacy: a systemic understanding 
Privacy is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. First the choice of this term 
needs to be justified. For some scholars ‘privacy’ is an overly limited concept for 
investigating widespread surveillance practices (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012). 
Coll (2014) argues that when privacy is given a precise ‘bureaucratic’ definition, it 
in fact acts as an ally of surveillance by shaping subjects that diligently protect their 
own privacy without challenging broader structures. There are certainly definitional 
struggles around privacy. Many commentators agree about the importance of privacy 
but give subtly or radically different meanings to the term. Nevertheless, ‘privacy’ 
has proved to be a resilient and evocative term around which many debates and 
networks have been formed, together with the European concept ‘data protection’, 
which is somewhat narrower and more technical (Bennett 2012). Therefore privacy 
will be utilised as the central concept in this study. 
I will argue for a particular systemic understanding of privacy that seeks to put 
privacy into a broader societal context rather than perceiving it as an individual 
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interest. When considering the possibilities of privacy in the future and future 
governance of privacy, we need to consider the whole picture in order to avoid partial 
optimisation. Over decades of scholarship, definitions of privacy have proliferated 
in different fields. The different views on privacy may be classified according to two 
axes: 1) emphasis on the micro, relational or macro level and 2) emphasis on 
subjective factors such as experiences and values or emphasis on objective factors 
such as the social mechanisms around privacy (Minkkinen 2015). Table 2 presents 
an overview of privacy definitions. 
Table 2. Definitions of privacy (Minkkinen 2015). 
 
Subjective 
definitions: 
experiences, norms, 
values Objective definitions: mechanisms, functions 
Micro: 
individuals 
Privacy as control 
over personal 
information (Westin 
1967). 
Privacy as precondition for dignity, respect and 
moral autonomy (Benn 1971; Bloustein 1964; 
Floridi 2016; Reiman 1976). Privacy as the right 
to be let alone: protection from intrusion, 
interference and information access (Gavison 
1980; Tavani 2008; Warren and Brandeis 1890). 
Relational: 
relationships 
and groups 
Privacy as norms that 
ensure appropriate 
flows of information 
(Nissenbaum 2010). 
Privacy as necessary for intimate relationships 
through differential sharing of personal 
information (Rachels 1975; Fried 1968). Privacy 
as a dynamic process of negotiating boundaries 
and forming self-identity in social relations 
(Cohen 2012; Petronio 2002; Schoeman 1992; 
Steeves 2009). 
Macro: society Privacy as a shared 
value (Regan 1995). 
Privacy as a feature of social structure, a 
societally constructed right or fundamental right, 
and a socially created need (Baghai 2012; 
González Fuster 2014; Moore 1984; Solove 
2008; Westin 2003). 
 
On the micro level, there is a distinction between privacy as control over personal 
information (Westin 1967) and privacy as a right or condition of limited access 
related to human dignity and moral autonomy (Benn 1971; Bloustein 1964; Floridi 
2016; Gavison 1980; Reiman 1976; Tavani 2008; Warren and Brandeis 1890). On 
the relational level, privacy is viewed as crucial for social interaction, and scholars 
emphasise either subjective norms (Nissenbaum 2010) or objective processes of 
relationship maintenance and negotiation of boundaries (Cohen 2012; Fried 1968; 
Petronio 2002; Rachels 1975; Schoeman 1992; Steeves 2009). On the macro level, 
privacy has been defined as a shared value (Regan 1995) and as a feature of 
existing social structure (Baghai 2012; Moore 1984; Solove 2008; Westin 2003). 
This overview suggests that definitions need not be mutually exclusive because 
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they focus on different aspects of a complex phenomenon. Privacy is also difficult 
to place in any single interpretive frame because it evolves over history, and 
different aspects of the phenomenon are salient in different times, due to societal 
concerns such as terrorism and questions raised by technologies such as the rise of 
computers after the Second World War and new technologies such as Big Data 
analytics, the Internet of Things and networked sensors in smart cities today. 
Moreover, privacy seems to operate at the boundaries between different societal 
levels (micro, meso, macro) and spheres of social action (Nissenbaum 2010; 
Schoeman 1992). This dynamic nature is important to remember since “all 
definitions of privacy, to some extent, are based on questionable assumptions about 
individualism, and about the distinction between the realms of civil society and the 
state” (Bennett and Raab 2006, xxii). 
In this study, I will address the task of defining privacy by focusing on privacy 
protection as societal rules that govern data flows and uses of data (Nissenbaum 
2010; Richards 2015a). Viewed in this way, privacy can be defined as a social 
institution, which includes rules, instruments, norms and actor roles. This institution 
structures expectations about social practices in the context of complexity. The rules 
can take different forms, ranging from implicit social cues and norms to binding 
legislation. They may be contextual, such as norms about certain rooms within a 
household, or broadly applied. Crucially, privacy protection rules exist in a social 
context with sets of institutions, structures, dominant technologies, social 
imaginaries and so on. Furthermore, I argue below that at present, privacy rules 
primarily protect dynamic processes of anticipation that are disrupted by 
surveillance practices. By extension, privacy protects a particular kind of 
anticipatory society. 
Before investigating privacy further, the focal problems that guide this study 
should be clarified. This is not only an academic undertaking because as Nilsson et 
al. (2011, 1125) state, underlying norms and cognitive perceptions about problems 
and solutions are key to developing adequate policies. It is possible to identify 
several partly overlapping types of privacy issues. They may be heuristically divided 
into three categories: 
1. Criminal data breaches and hacks 
2. Individuals’ experiences of anxiety, discomfort, loss of privacy, loss of 
control and other direct or indirect harms 
3. Structural and often invisible issues related to power, domination, 
autonomy and behavioural manipulation 
Firstly, there are legitimate concerns around criminal exploits, which are likely to 
become an increasingly significant issue for digitalising societies. Focusing on data 
breaches and hacks frames privacy as a rather technical issue connected to 
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cybersecurity and specific technological measures to secure systems. Interestingly, 
privacy understood as protection from criminals, hackers and identity thieves has 
been found to facilitate the development of government surveillance technologies 
in the United States (Rider 2018). This first aspect of privacy is regularly discussed 
in computer science, for instance. Even though they are important, these 
cybersecurity concerns are not investigated in this dissertation. Secondly, there are 
harms that individuals experience such as anxiety, loss of control and potentially 
also more tangible harms. Thirdly, there are more invisible structural issues related 
to unequal power relationships and the potential for domination and behavioural 
manipulation. The two latter types of issues are difficult to disentangle, but it is 
important to analytically distinguish between them because they point to different 
privacy conceptions and different kinds of solutions. Methodologically 
individualist studies of privacy concerns, for instance, focus on individuals’ 
experienced privacy concerns and individual privacy management (e.g. Bellman et 
al. 2004). This approach tends to locate privacy on the subjective end of Table 2, 
as an individual interest or value. This aspect of privacy could be titled experiential 
privacy. 
While the experiences of individuals are important, the less visible structural 
underpinnings of privacy are at least equally important because they are linked to 
broader socioeconomic processes. Focusing on power issues, as in surveillance 
studies for instance, tends to convey privacy in more objective terms, as a condition 
or a right rather than a subjective experience or concern. This aspect of privacy could 
be titled structural privacy or institutional privacy. Recently, some authors have 
argued that privacy should be seen through the lens of power and domination rather 
than experienced harms (Austin 2015; Cohen 2013; van der Sloot 2018). If structural 
issues were neglected, the solution to privacy issues could be to maintain current 
power relations and simply make surveillance more smooth and comfortable. While 
considering each of these aspects of privacy is valuable, I will focus on the third type 
because it is crucial for considering societal futures, and it is often unexplored in 
more technical and individualistic discussions of privacy. 
A systemic perspective on privacy protection draws attention to the different 
actors, factors and their relations that influence privacy protection. Beginning with 
actors, Raab and Koops (2009) discuss the roles of various actors in the privacy 
system and present a categorisation duplicated in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Actors and their privacy roles and responsibilities (Raab and Koops 2009, 215). 
Actor Responsibility 
Constitution-maker Stipulate the right to privacy 
Legislature Make privacy-compliant laws and data protection acts 
Data protection authority Supervise and enforce compliance, encourage good practice, 
raise awareness in public and politics 
Court Decide cases involving privacy breaches 
Government department 
or agency 
Compliance, staff training in privacy protection 
Private company Compliance, staff training in privacy protection 
Privacy activist 
organisation 
Campaign for privacy, propose regulations, raise public 
awareness 
Academic Explain privacy and data protection, discern long-term 
developments 
Journalist Highlight issues and events, explain policies and developments 
Consumer Protect own privacy, complain 
Citizen Protect own privacy, complain 
Technology developer Implement privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), educate IT 
professional staff about privacy 
 
The authors stipulate continuous conflict and negotiation as major processes in the 
system rather than simplistic stories of “onward march of privacy protection or the 
inevitable erosion of privacy” (Raab and Koops 2009, 213). While the set of actors 
is comprehensive, their roles are viewed rather narrowly. For instance, consumers 
and citizens are seen to have identical roles: only protecting their own privacy and 
filing complaints. What about the power of conscious consumers to shape prevailing 
privacy practices through their choices? What influence can citizens have as political 
actors through numerous channels such as campaigning, prefigurative politics and 
direct action? Similarly, many private companies play a much larger role in societal 
negotiation over privacy than simply compliance and staff training. If we take a 
broader view of the privacy protection system, beyond the formal responsibilities of 
actors, groups of actors such as citizens or governments may also play more 
significant roles in the evolution of privacy protection. 
Viewed from a systemic perspective, privacy protection is also linked to a 
number of societal processes and practices. To understand the systemic linkages of 
privacy protection, I present a heuristic ‘privacy dynamics model’ in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Privacy dynamics model, adapted from Minkkinen (2015). 
The model attempts to place privacy protection in a social context taking into account 
current surveillance issues and the futures perspective. Privacy protection rules and 
instruments (e.g. Bennett and Raab 2006) govern surveillance practices, which in 
turn influence everyday anticipatory practices. The surveillance practices may entail 
data collection, processing and dissemination (Solove 2008). Increasingly, 
surveillance practices are future-oriented, involving predictive analytics on datafied 
populations (Mantelero 2016). This future orientation of surveillance will be 
discussed in the next section. 
The arrow between surveillance practices and everyday anticipation is 
bidirectional because individuals and groups are not only passive subjects of 
surveillance, but they also protect their privacy in many ways. The so-called privacy 
self-management paradigm is still strong in the privacy protection regime, in Europe 
and elsewhere (e.g. Lehtiniemi and Kortesniemi 2017). However, this paradigm has 
come under heavy criticism recently for failing to protect individual privacy and 
underplaying privacy as a collective and relational phenomenon (e.g. Baruh and 
Popescu 2017). Privacy self-management, relying on notice and choice, could be 
characterised as a dominant imaginary in the privacy protection system, which relies 
on the notion of conscious active citizens. 
The model includes three key systemic drivers of surveillance practices, each of 
which contributes through a different mechanism. The information-processing 
imperative refers to the taken-for-granted cultural view that more information is 
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better, which is rooted in the Enlightenment notion that knowledge discovery 
inevitably leads to forward progress (Cohen 2012, Ch. 5). This imperative holds in 
many areas, including security, public administration and business. The dominant 
logic of accumulation, in turn, refers to the business models that mandate ever-
increasing surveillance and collection of personal data (Zuboff 2015). Global 
technology firms monetise the content and behavioural patterns of their users by 
creating and selling predictions about future behaviour. A related notion is the so-
called ‘surveillance-industrial complex’, which directs attention to the global market 
around surveillance practices, where there are intimate links between governments, 
state agencies and corporations (Hayes 2012). Enabling technologies refers to all the 
technological advances that make contemporary data practices possible: big data 
analytics, Internet of things, social media, the semantic web and so on. Taken 
together, these three systemic drivers seem to add up to an insurmountable threat to 
privacy, as data processing is seen as beneficial, profitable and powerfully promoted 
by the affordances given by technologies. It should be noted that technologies also 
provide affordances for privacy protection, such as so-called privacy-enhancing 
technologies. Examples include public key encryption and various designs for 
increasing individuals’ obscurity in online activities. However, the important point 
is that technologies do not simply emerge, but they are consciously designed driven 
by certain goals and values, usually increasing efficiency and productivity. Once 
implemented, they are not simply neutral tools, but they provide certain affordances 
and tilt development towards certain directions. 
3.2 Privacy at the intersection of three types of 
anticipation 
The powerful drive towards increasing data processing and surveillance is the reason 
why discussions on the future of privacy are sometimes met with remarks that 
privacy does not even have a present, let alone a future. However, the relationship 
between privacy and futures is more complex. In the following, I argue that privacy 
rules operate at the intersection of three different types of anticipatory practices, 
indicated in Figure 3 as “Anticipatory institutional change”, “Surveillance practices” 
and “Anticipation in everyday life”. Hence privacy rules influence what kind of 
anticipation takes place rather simply promoting or hindering anticipation. 
Prevailing anticipatory orientations and practices, in turn, define how futures of 
privacy and futures more broadly are conceived. 
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3.2.1 Anticipatory institutional change 
Like any social institution, privacy protection rules are in the process of historical 
evolution, and a historical perspective is necessary for understanding these changes 
(Thelen 2003). History should not be seen as a purely objective chain of events and 
facts, but rather as a more complex flow of occurrences, some of which may be 
framed as significant events and given meaning from different perspectives. The 
historical phases of privacy protection have been traced, for instance, by Mayer-
Schönberger (1997) for Europe and Westin (2003) for the United States. There are 
continuous contestations and negotiation processes around privacy rules, which 
include variation, selection and retention of imaginaries and practices. In these 
processes, the perceived plausibility of imaginaries and practices is important for 
their institutionalisation. Depending on their scope, these negotiation processes may 
influence both privacy protection rules and the drivers of surveillance practices. The 
current European approach regulates data protection broadly across sectors, but 
sectoral legislation in many areas is also significant for data protection. 
The negotiation on plausible privacy futures takes place in a historical situation 
marked by path-dependencies and structural constraints. There are strong cultural 
worldviews around privacy such as liberalism and communitarianism (6 1998b; 
Minkkinen, Auffermann, and Heinonen 2017). In particular, all three drivers of 
surveillance practices play a role in the selection and retention of plausible futures. 
For example, images of the future with significantly decreased data collection, online 
space free from advertising and absence of new technologies are likely to be deemed 
implausible. However, none of these factors are deterministic, and they may be 
opened to negotiation, although this may be a risky strategy. The dilemmas related 
to questioning underlying drivers will be explored in the discussion chapter. 
3.2.2 Surveillance practices 
Privacy protection develops through an anticipatory negotiation process, as 
discussed above. Privacy is also related to a different type of anticipation that is 
becoming increasingly prominent: surveillance practices involving predictive 
analytics and Big Data. Surveillance is the focal topic of the emerging field of 
surveillance studies, and it may be defined as attention that is purposeful, routine, 
systematic, and focused (Cohen 2013). Another definition of contemporary 
surveillance is “scrutiny of individuals, groups, and contexts through the use of 
technical means to extract or create information” (Marx 2016). Surveillance can be 
seen as a fundamental social ordering process (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012). A 
foundational work in surveillance studies is Michel Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish, which outlines the modern organisation of power as panoptic surveillance, 
internalised discipline and normalisation of individuals and populations (Foucault 
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1995). Some authors distinguish between surveillance and dataveillance, the latter 
being more continuous and involving ambiguous purposes (van Dijck 2014). New 
technological tools make it possible to process large amounts of data on individuals, 
groups or entire populations (Mantelero 2016). These data are refined through 
statistical analyses, algorithms and possibly machine learning to develop predictive 
insights, including profiling and categorising of individuals, which then guide 
decisions such as targeting of advertisements, behavioural nudges or policy 
decisions made by public authorities. In particular, ‘hypernudges’ based on Big Data 
and dynamic feedback loops are an extremely powerful method of behaviour 
modification, which can potentially influence millions of online platform users 
simultaneously (Yeung 2017). 
These analytics and behavioural nudges generally happen entirely outside 
individuals’ knowledge and control, and the algorithms are trade or state secrets. 
Likewise, the industry of data brokers that processes data and sells prediction 
products is mostly invisible. Thus anticipatory capacities are redistributed from 
human subjects to technological systems and the actors that control such systems (cf. 
Groves 2017). The secrecy and diffuse nature of contemporary surveillance further 
diminishes the potential for reciprocity in previous forms of surveillance. 
Surveillance by neighbours, though potentially invasive, is radically different from 
surveillance by hundreds of data brokers, foreign states and the world’s largest 
companies. In the field of social media and online search engines, these capacities 
have been developed at least since the early 2000s, following the bursting of the dot-
com bubble (e.g. Zuboff 2015). There is currently a significant trend towards 
utilising Big Data in fields such as healthcare, education, urban planning and security 
(Couldry and Yu 2018). While data may also concern physical infrastructure, it is 
particularly valuable when it concerns human individuals. 
Like anticipatory institutional change, this type of anticipation also involves a 
feedback loop, which Cohen terms ‘modulation’. Modulation refers to processes in 
which surveillant attention is continuously modified according to the subject’s 
behaviour with logics outside the subject’s control (Cohen 2013, 1915). These forms 
of data processing may have far-ranging consequences for the social contract 
between governments, companies and citizens/consumers since according to some 
authors they are part of a broader process of datafication where individuals are 
increasingly seen through quantified data points, allowing for real-time tracking and 
predictive analysis (van Dijck 2014). Austin (2015) calls this “governance through 
profiling and categorisation” where organisations predict what individuals will do 
and seek to regulate this predicted future action. Even though datafication is 
increasingly normalised, it should be seen as a particular semiotic process that does 
not only neutrally describe the objective world (van Dijck 2014). Instead, 
datafication constructs certain kinds of understandings of the world by selecting 
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certain aspects of the world as decontextualised measurements and processing and 
combining them in order to find correlations, patterns and so on. 
The prevalence of Big Data and predictive analytics can be seen as a sign of 
increasing societal future orientation, and it is often seen as an opportunity for futures 
studies. However, it promotes a particular kind of future orientation based on 
extracting discrete data points from ongoing social interaction processes and 
calculating predictions based on these data points. These are relatively 
unproblematic when calculating risks of infrastructure breakage, for instance, but 
when datafied human beings are involved, there are two kinds of problems. Firstly, 
there is a great risk of false certainty since humans tend to act in surprising ways. 
More importantly, modifying human behaviour by predicting it raises significant 
ethical questions. When technological predictions become an ingrained part of 
society, they are likely to alter predominant views on human subjectivity and the 
roles of citizens vis-á-vis the actors creating the predictions (Couldry and Mejias 
2018). If citizens’ futures are always already calculated based on profiles, what space 
is left for their own future-oriented projects in the ‘sea of expectations’ (van Lente 
2012)? These technological predictions are clearly different from the societal 
negotiation on plausible futures identified in the previous section. 
3.2.3 Anticipation in everyday life 
A third type of anticipation relevant to privacy is the everyday anticipation of 
individuals and groups. In everyday anticipation, sensemaking and action are 
intimately linked. Sum and Jessop (2013) argue that in order to ‘go on’ in the world, 
actors need to reduce complexity by continuously making sense of the world around 
them and formulating simpler models of complex situations. Here I am particularly 
focusing on the future-oriented aspect of such sensemaking. Emirbayer and Mische 
(1998), in a much cited paper, identify the ‘projective dimension’ of agency and 
argue that human actors imagine new possibilities and negotiate paths towards the 
future in an interactive process. The authors argue that “the specific culturally 
embedded ways in which people imagine, talk about, negotiate, and make 
commitments to their futures influence their degree of freedom and maneuverability 
in relation to existing structures” (p. 985). They also note that imaginative narrative 
construction and experimentation, the tentative enactment of alternative courses of 
action, are crucial for human agency (p. 988). In psychology, in turn, agency has 
been connected to possible selves, conceptions of oneself as a living and acting 
human in future situations that often take a narrative form (Erikson 2007). The first-
person perspective of a particular human actor makes this type of anticipation 
different from abstract representations of futures. 
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This kind of everyday anticipation is connected to studies on (non-expert) 
individuals’ images of the future (e.g. Minkkinen, Auffermann, and Heinonen 2017; 
Rubin 2013), often discussed through the lens of hopes, fears and aspirations. Apart 
from such studies on the content of images of the future, this micro-level anticipation 
has not received much attention in futures research, which is usually seen as a 
somewhat instrumental field, used either in policy or business strategy. 
Recently, the emerging literature on futures literacy has drawn attention to these 
processes by emphasising the value of specific, unique and ephemeral anticipatory 
assumptions (Miller 2018b). Groves (2017) also discusses ‘lived futures’ as a 
contrast to abstract calculations and the empty futures of planning. He characterises 
lived futures as narratives involving a multiplicity of experiences of place and 
community, and particular objects of concern with needs and vulnerabilities. Lived 
futures are intimately linked to material practices with particular rhythms through 
which the future is ‘known’ (Groves 2017). Our five-dimensional model of futures 
consciousness contributes to this literature by reviewing several related concepts and 
providing a basis for analysing futures consciousness at individual and group levels 
(Ahvenharju, Minkkinen, and Lalot 2018). Cultural sociologists have also 
contributed by investigating the ‘project’ as a central concept for future orientation 
(Mische 2009) and developing a model of actors coordinating futures at different 
levels (protention, trajectories, temporal landscape) (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013). 
Surveillance practices may supplant and disrupt everyday anticipation, although 
the connection is not linear and everyday anticipation may also challenge or utilise 
surveillance systems. Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 1005–6) ask which kind of 
contexts tend to keep actors engaged in habitual responses and which kind of 
contexts facilitate imaginative distance and projection of future alternatives and 
communicative deliberation over actions. Surveillance in general tends to direct 
behaviour towards conventional and socially acceptable practices, producing 
“tractable, predictable citizen-consumers whose preferred modes of self-
determination play out along predictable and profit-generating trajectories” (Cohen 
2013, 1917; Richards 2015b, 101). Predictive analytics, in particular, is relevant for 
the future orientation of action because data-driven predictive systems continuously 
fill an actor’s future with calculated predictions. The predictions are then used as a 
basis for influencing the actor, by recommending certain products or nudging 
behaviour in a certain direction, for instance. These predictions are based on 
observed past patterns. While in everyday life, this often provides convencience, it 
also redistributes anticipatory capacity from the actors and their imaginative and 
experimental practices to such calculation-based systems. As Poli (2017, 1:254) 
states, “[v]iolating [the integrity of one’s body] and reducing [the integrity of one’s 
mind] immediately cut short an agent’s capacity to see and use her future”. Even 
without normative evaluation, we can note that these are different anticipatory 
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systems with different emphases on creative imagination and data-driven 
calculation. Groves (2017) discusses the abstracted and emptied future horizon that 
underlies formal calculation. Abstraction means the flattening of complex processes 
into context-free quantitative indicators (system variables), while emptying is a 
related process where the future is viewed as a space of possibilities with discrete 
decision points in order to optimise outcomes. Likewise Anderson (2010) notes 
calculation as one type of anticipatory practices where absent futures are made 
present through calculations of probabilities rather than imagining or enacting 
possible futures. 
We may hypothesise that in a society that emphasises efficiency, data-driven 
surveillance is likely to increase because actors’ everyday anticipation processes are 
likely to be less efficient, at least in the short run. Human actors need time to consider 
different options and experiment, even though intuitive decisions may also be made 
very rapidly. In any case, the fact that a calculated future or calculated futures already 
exist not only makes this process faster or more evidence-based but also changes its 
nature. Similarly, it does not only change outward behaviour but the meaning of 
behaviour for agents. In contrast to calculative and optimising practices, lived 
anticipation in everyday life is highly embodied and contextual, involving affects 
and emotion — hope, fear, longing, anxiety, concern over particular objects of 
concern, loved ones and so on (Groves 2017). 
The relevance of privacy in this context is that privacy rules protect everyday 
anticipation by limiting surveillance practices that disrupt this kind of anticipation. 
Privacy can be seen as breathing space for futures at the intersection between three 
types of anticipation. Privacy rules are built through an anticipatory societal process, 
they regulate predictive surveillance and they enable everyday anticipation. 
Accounts of privacy as necessary for intimate relationships and personhood were 
already put forward in the 1970s (Reiman 1976). Recent privacy theorists have 
drawn attention to the dynamic nature of the processes that privacy protects. Cohen 
(2013) argues that privacy shelters processes of play and experimentation from 
which innovation emerges. For her, privacy regulation must maintain “interstitial 
spaces” where dynamic, emergent subjectivity may develop and flourish (Cohen 
2013). For Cohen, “the play of everyday practice is the means by which human 
beings flourish. It is the modality through which situated subjects advance their own 
contingent goals, constitute communities, and imagine their possible futures” 
(Cohen 2012, unpaginated, emphasis added). Similarly, Richards (2015b, 5–6, 95–
96) views privacy rules as safeguards of sensemaking, intellectual exploration, idea 
generation and belief formation, which surveillance tends to chill and drive towards 
the mainstream. According to Richards (2015b, 108), privacy protection nurtures a 
“culture of vibrant intellectual innovation” and human imagination. In his view, 
ideas often need to be discussed and tested in more restricted spaces before public 
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exposure — a notion that is familiar to most academics. Brewster and Hine (2013) 
link privacy to spaces of ambiguity and incomplete legibility, historically found in 
cities, which enable creativity and innovation. Privacy can then generate futures by 
providing space for new ideas and practices (Poli 2017). 
Floridi (2016) presents a somewhat different framing of similar ideas. From a 
philosophical perspective, he argues that humans are characterised by permanent 
incompleteness: “We are the incomplete species that wants, that misses, that asks 
questions, that has doubts, that worries or rejoices about the future and regrets or 
feels nostalgia or saudade about the past, that can see the other side of the coin” 
(Floridi 2016, 309). Central to human dignity is the possibility to remain open and 
in the process of becoming and resist efforts for closure. From this perspective, many 
contemporary surveillance practices attempt to ‘close’ individuals by profiling them 
and predicting their future behaviour. From the perspective of anticipation studies 
and the capabilities approach, Poli (2017, 1:253–54) discusses agents (individuals, 
communities, organisations) as continuously unfolding, and becoming a fully human 
person requires constant care and enabling conditions. The psychological theory of 
possible selves also highlights the self-concept as forward-looking and dynamic, 
influenced by hopes, fears and motivations, rather than fixed (Markus and Nurius 
1986). Privacy, properly understood, thus enables open-ended human flourishing 
and maintaining multiple ‘possible selves’ rather than secrecy and isolation to protect 
an essentialistic self. 
Privacy as an enabler of everyday anticipation should be connected to the critical 
literature on alienation and the potential inherent in everyday life. In Western 
sociology, critical theory and cultural philosophy, alienation and social order in 
modernity are among the grand themes. Émile Durkheim’s study of anomie, Georg 
Simmel’s ‘tragedy of culture’ where objective culture threatens to overcome 
humans, Max Weber’s notion of ‘instrumental rationality’ and Walter Benjamin’s 
loss of the ‘aura’ in the age of technological reproducibility all touch on similar 
themes of human alienation and the possibility of de-alienation and flourishing 
(Benjamin 2008; Durkheim 1999; Simmel [1911] 1997; Weber 1978). The Frankfurt 
School’s discussions on the irrational elements in Enlightenment thinking, the 
alienating ‘culture industry’ and the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system also 
discuss similar themes (Adorno and Horkheimer [1944] 1997; Habermas 1984). 
‘Everyday life’ has often been an ambiguous underlying theme in such discussions. 
The critique of everyday life has been explicitly taken up by French philosophers 
after the Second World War. For Henri Lefebvre, the everyday world is where the 
individual acquires a coherent selfhood, and imaginative everyday activity is easily 
transformed into routinised and commodified forms as human capacities are 
transferred to an anonymous apparatus (Gardiner 2000, 76–77). Lefebvre (quoted in 
Gardiner 2000, 79) describes everyday life as “residual, defined by ‘what is left over’ 
Locating Privacy as a Systemic and Anticipatory Phenomenon 
 51 
after all distinct, superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out by 
analysis”. According to Poli (2017, 1:93), Ernst Bloch also saw hope and utopian 
potential in everyday life. On the other hand, Lefebvre warns against the notion of a 
self-sufficient individual living a life of ‘privation’, deprived of links with the world 
(Gardiner 2000, 83). In later writings, he was concerned with the all-pervasive 
technical control without a substantive vision of what a good society looks like, 
echoing Frederik Polak’s argument in the Image of the Future (Gardiner 2000, 89; 
Polak 1973). Michel de Certeau, in contrast, highlighted the possibilities of 
spontaneous human agency and tactics of everyday resistance (Gardiner 2000, 
p. 168; Kalekin-Fishman 2011). In American sociology, Erving Goffman studied the 
presentation of self in everyday life, and the difference between ‘front stage’ and 
‘backstage’ behaviour (Kalekin-Fishman 2011).7 In this context, privacy should be 
seen not as protection of the isolated individual with secret information, but as 
protection of the potential inherent in anticipatory everyday life. We can then ask 
what tactics for spontaneous creativity exist in the conditions of ubiquitous 
predictive analytics, and whether all behaviour becomes front stage behaviour. 
The critical perspective focusing on the transformative potential of everyday life 
is inherently normative and emancipatory, in the vein of the ‘decolonisation’ of 
futures (Miller 2018b). Moreover, I would argue that it is connected to aesthetics in 
addition to ethics. Eidinow and Ramirez (2016) argue that aesthetic judgments about 
what feels appropriate, elegant or ugly significantly influence the perceived 
plausibility of futures. In a similar way, a society where individuals and groups have 
broad scope for relatively autonomous anticipation may feel inappropriate to certain 
actors even before judging its ethical preferability. In ‘Sociological Aesthetics’, 
originally from 1896, Georg Simmel considers society from an aesthetic point of 
view, arguing that certain aesthetic perspectives leave more room for individual 
differences than others, noting the attraction of both ‘socialistic’ and ‘individualistic’ 
forms of society (Simmel 1968). Similarly we may consider the different aesthetics 
and ethics of centralised (either to human decision-makers or algorithms) and 
distributed anticipation within society. Poli, for instance, allies himself with 
individualism: “Politics and institutions have the duty of creating best possible 
conditions for the largest possible number of individuals to become full and stable 
persons” (Poli 2017, 1:253). Groves (2014, 217) makes the connection between 
living with uncertainty and human flourishing: “To live with reflexive uncertainty, 
it is necessary […] to embrace an ethics and morality of future-oriented care in which 
moral reflection must focus on the potential for flourishing created by the strategies 
 
 
7  There is also a great deal of empirical, mostly descriptive, scholarship on everyday life. 
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for domesticating uncertainty [e.g. surveillance] that are enacted within a society’s 
forms of life.” 
Everyday anticipation, which privacy rules protect, may be seen as ethically 
valuable for its own sake regardless of its broader societal consequences, as in 
Floridi’s and Groves’s accounts. However, Cohen’s and Richards’s accounts suggest 
an additional link from the micro level to the macro level. Since privacy protects 
dynamic experimentation, imagination and innovation, from the macro perspective 
it provides variation to the discourses, practices and imaginaries that enter into 
societal negotiation on plausible futures. This is the broader anticipatory feedback 
loop in addition to the feedback loops in anticipatory institutional change 
(influencing futures through imaginaries) and predictive analytics (influencing 
behaviour through predictions). From the institutional change perspective, 
continuing variation on established practices is seen as a source of gradual and 
potentially transformative change (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Mahoney and 
Thelen 2009). In a similar way, Poli (2017, 1:187–88) states that complex systems 
are creative: they have the capacity to change, reframe, learn and become different 
from what they were. From this perspective, privacy not only maintains possible 
selves but helps to generate futures for the broader system. 
Privacy is thus important for futures thinking, but not simply in the sense that 
more privacy means a stronger future orientation in thinking and action. Instead, 
privacy enables a qualitatively different kind of future orientation, one that is 
distributed rather than centralised, and involves exploration, creativity and 
alternative open futures beyond continuation of present trends. Surveillance 
practices redistribute anticipatory capacities and thus change the balance of power 
and alter the future orientation of society. 
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4 Case and Methods: Studying the 
Co-evolution of Imaginaries and 
Institutions in the EU Data 
Protection Reform 
The previous chapter brought together numerous theoretical perspectives both on 
critical-analytical futures studies as the study of social change processes and the 
position of privacy in broader social context. What is an appropriate analytical 
strategy for studying anticipatory dynamics in these phenomena and identifying 
latent future potentials? This chapter outlines the operationalisation of the approach 
presented in the previous chapter, that is, methodological tools for qualitative study 
of anticipatory institutional change in the case of the EU data protection reform. The 
methodological approach is given the title context, actor storylines, imaginaries and 
latents (CASIL). 
4.1 Overview of the case: EU data protection 
reform 
The data protection reform in the European Union is an interesting case of 
institutional change for several reasons. Firstly, the scope of the regulation is 
unusually broad, covering both public and private sector processing of personal data. 
Secondly, the reform represents an opening in the path-dependent EU data protection 
framework, and the resulting regulation is likely to apply for decades. Thirdly, the 
process was heavily lobbied and numerous stakeholders expressed their views about 
a desirable future privacy framework. Finally, the European Union data protection 
framework is broadly viewed as a leading data protection approach, some elements 
of which are likely to be adopted in other regions over time (Bennett and Raab 2018). 
The overall timeline of the reform, heuristically divided into an opening phase and a 
narrowing phase, is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Timeline of the EU data protection reform (Minkkinen 2019a). 
Month Process stage 
Opening phase  
May 2009 Stakeholder conference 
December 2009 Treaty of Lisbon; Public consultation on legal framework 
November 2010 European Commission’s communication on a comprehensive 
approach 
January 2011 Public consultation on comprehensive approach 
Narrowing phase  
January 2012 European Commission proposes Regulation 
October 2010 to 
December 2014 
Council meetings 
March 2014 Debate and vote in Parliament 
June to December 2015 Trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, Council 
and Commission 
December 2015 Agreement on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
April 2016 Adoption of the GDPR by the European Parliament 
May 2018 The GDPR became enforceable 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon was an important structural enabler for the reform by making 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding (De Hert and 
Papakonstantinou 2012). The reform was a complex process that involved 
negotiations among stakeholders and EU institutions in different phases. My study 
focuses specifically on the opening phase when stakeholder consultations were 
conducted, because this is the most interesting phase for investigating the 
anticipatory aspects of the reform, and the analysis of the subsequent phases would 
require in-depth study of the functioning of EU institutions as well as considering 
the thousands of amendments proposed during the heavily lobbied process. 
The outcome of the reform process, the General Data Protection Regulation, can 
be seen as a spatio-temporal fix (Sum and Jessop 2013), which temporarily stabilises 
the contradictory tendencies in the data-driven economy. In the following sections, 
I will present methods for studying this process. 
4.2 Methodological principles 
The primary principles underlying the choice of methodology are compatibility with 
the theoretical starting points, pluralism and reflexivity. Since the social phenomena 
under study are complex, no single method can produce a full account and selectivity 
is inevitable. Thus for a richer account, it is important to be able to utilise different 
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methods while being aware of their inherent limitations and different starting points 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). 
Futures research, sometimes viewed as a method science, includes a large set of 
methods. However, many established methods such as Delphi are intended for 
producing scenarios or images of the future or practice-oriented foresight rather than 
investigating broader social change and the role of existing futures thinking. Social 
scientifically oriented backcasting (Wangel 2011) and reflexive scenario methods 
(e.g. Ramírez and Wilkinson 2016; Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008) provide useful 
tools, but the starting point is different, since they are still concerned with producing 
plausible imaginaries rather than investigating the role of imaginaries in social 
change. Critical methods such as causal layered analysis (Inayatullah 2004), in turn, 
investigate predominant worldviews and myths but do not include explicit 
consideration of temporality, and so far adding the dimension of temporality has only 
been discussed in the context of producing policy-relevant scenarios (Hughes 2013). 
Finally, workshop methods such as futures cliniques (Heinonen and Ruotsalainen 
2013), futures literacy labs (Miller 2018a), design-based foresight (Tuomi 2019) and 
the three horizons method (Sharpe et al. 2016) are aimed at producing actionable 
insights for involved actors rather than scholarly analysis.8 All of these approaches 
are valuable for their intended purposes, but different tools are needed for 
investigating the societal dynamics of imaginaries and institutions. 
I argue that the meso level of institutions and imaginaries provides an entry point 
to studying social change. A strict division into ‘micro’, ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ levels 
is somewhat artificial, and it is only one way of making sense of complex societies. 
Social change may certainly originate from any level. Nevertheless, the meso level 
enables flexibly considering structures, discourses and processes at different levels, 
from everyday life to global policies. If the object of study was a singular and 
undifferentiated ‘society’ and its ‘dominant worldviews’, this would be an inflexible 
starting point, since it assumes that we can study society as a totality with certain 
characteristics or system variables and that there are worldviews that are dominant 
across social spheres. In addition to the problem of justifying these assumptions, this 
level of abstraction makes empirical research difficult. Likewise, if the object of 
study were individuals and their attitudes, this would limit the discussion to atomised 
individuals with ostensibly stable characteristics and make it difficult to investigate 
broader societal dynamics. 
An abductive qualitative approach is appropriate for studying institutions and 
imaginaries because it permits novel interpretations on unfolding processes rather 
than having fixed methodological steps. Abduction means the interpretation of 
 
 
8  Causal layered analysis is also a workshop method that could be added to this list. 
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observations based on hypothesised overarching patterns that would explain it 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 4). Abductive reasoning does not seek final truths, 
but instead it is a continuous hermeneutic process of interpreting, creatively 
reinterpreting and seeking new observations and theoretical frames (Tavory and 
Timmermans 2014,. pp. 10–12). Tavory and Timmermans (2014 Ch. 6) state that 
abduction-based qualitative research is compatible with a mechanism-based notion 
of causality that separates explanation from empirical regularities and prediction, as 
I explained in the theory chapter. Tavory and Timmermans (2014, 135) argue that 
“Peirce’s semiotics provides researchers with irreducible building blocks from 
which they can construct mechanism-based accounts of causality — a continuous 
and intelligible process that allows us to trace patterns of meaning-making as they 
emerge in action”. They focus on micro-level actions but the same principle holds 
also for other levels of human action, although increased complexity needs to be 
taken into account. In their exposition of cultural political economy, Sum and Jessop 
(2013, 9) advocate critical realist ‘retroduction’, a continuous and open process of 
asking “what must the world be like for X to happen”. For empirical research 
purposes, this seems very similar to the more established notion of abduction. 
4.3 The ‘context, actor storylines, imaginaries and 
latents’ (CASIL) approach 
Before turning to methods, it is important to clarify the conception of the 
phenomenon that is studied. The anticipatory institutional change process is 
modelled in Figure 4. Two interrelated complexity reduction processes are 
identified: semiosis and structuration. For the sake of simplicity, the temporal phases 
are divided into reproduction/gradual change and crisis, although in reality multiple 
processes take place simultaneously at different levels.9 At the beginning, there is an 
institution, such as the European data protection framework, and a discursive space 
that includes sedimented ways of understanding a phenomenon such as privacy. 
When the reproduction of this order comes under question, a crisis emerges that 
brings with it “a remarkable proliferation of alternative visions rooted in old and new 
semiotic systems and orders” (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). These competing 
imaginaries enter into a process of strategic contestation, such as the public 
consultation on the GDPR, which influences which parts of which imaginaries are 
retained in discourses, routines, identities as well as institutionalised into rules. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, negotiation over plausibility plays a key role in 
the process. In addition to the actual institutional transformation, there are many 
 
 
9  ‘Crisis’ is used here in the general sense of a decisive and unstable situation where a 
change in some direction is liable to happen soon. 
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counterfactual possibilities that could have actualised. After new rules are instituted, 
the process begins again. Underlying the explicit imaginaries is continuous variation 
in social practices, which may also increase during times of crisis.10 In studying such 
an anticipatory institutionalisation process, I argue that four stages are necessary: 1) 
investigating the historical context, 2) identifying actor storylines, 3) analysing the 
imaginaries embedded in the storylines and 4) identifying latent future possibilities. 
Together these elements constitute a flexible ‘toolkit’ for qualitatively studying 
anticipatory institutional change. Named after the elements, the novel approach is 
titled context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents (CASIL). The stages and 
suitable analysis methods in each stage are discussed below. 
 
Figure 4. Model of anticipatory institutional change. 
4.3.1 Historical context 
A temporal dimension is necessary for investigating causal mechanisms and 
historical processes. Cultural political economy offers a generic model of 
 
 
10  Poli (2017, 1:52) makes a distinction between representational/abstract anticipation and 
presentational/concrete anticipation reflects the difference between explicit 
consideration of imaginaries and continuous variation of social practices. See also 
Ahlqvist and Rhisiart (2015) on construction of futures through socio-technical 
practices. 
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mechanisms of the co-evolution of cultural meanings and social practices and 
institutions. The primary mechanisms are continuing variation in discourses and 
practices, selection of particular discourses and retention of some resonant 
discourses in institutional rules and/or imaginaries (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). 
CPE also makes a useful distinction between relatively stable reproduction, when 
imaginaries and rules are sedimented, and crises when they are brought into question. 
In order to avoid an overly sharp distinction between reproduction and crisis, it is 
useful to also consider the possibility of gradual institutional change, such as 
institutional drift (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Temporality should be viewed in 
strategic-relational terms (Sum and Jessop 2013, 48–54), as different steps in 
evolution rather than precise months or years. The simplified process in Figure 4 
includes an initial institution that is opened to question, leading to the articulation 
and selection of different imaginaries, some of which are retained. 
In methodological terms, the first step then is to investigate the broader context 
in which the imaginaries and institutions are placed. In the case of privacy protection, 
this requires contextualising the European privacy protection regime and its reform 
process and investigation of relevant aspects of the institutional context such as the 
prevalence of veto points and slow historical processes such as the proposed 
‘Eurolegalism’ (Kelemen 2011; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The broader discursive 
context is provided by the debate on the digital transformation. Then, a suitable 
historical event, or a set of events, needs to be selected to anchor the in-depth study 
of imaginaries and institutions. The choice of event depends on the research aims, 
but generally institutional openings provide a proliferation of imaginaries. In this 
dissertation, the event is the data protection reform in the European Union. The 
purpose of the temporal dimension is to understand and explain the process of change 
and identify latent possibilities rather than predicting its evolution into the future. 
The evolutionary processes described by cultural political economy are 
unpredictable, in the ontological sense discussed by Ilkka Tuomi (Tuomi 2019). This 
means that their outcomes may be understood and explained afterwards, but they 
cannot be predicted beforehand. Particularly in a field as dynamic as the 
sociotechnical change around privacy and surveillance, fixed scenarios have a 
significant risk of becoming obsolete at the next turn of events. However, we can 
make sense of anticipatory imaginaries and dynamics, and identify latent 
possibilities. 
Ideally, the consideration of historical context should also include an analysis of 
historically specific power dynamics, including forms of economic power and soft 
power, which influence how imaginaries and practices are selected and retained. The 
approach presented here focuses on uncovering and analysing the key storylines, 
imaginaries and latent possibilities in a situation. This approach emphasises power 
as embedded in the sociocultural system of imaginaries and institutions. A deeper 
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analysis of political and economic power and hegemonic struggles is a fruitful 
complementary future direction. 
4.3.2 Actor storylines 
The second necessary stage involves identifying the range of relevant actor storylines 
in the particular case under study. In practice this stage is closely tied to the 
identification of relevant deeper imaginaries underlying the storylines. They are 
analytically separated here for the sake of clarity. The relevant storylines are 
generally contextual, that is, relative to the specific phenomenon, particular actors 
and the point in time rather than the more detached and abstract images of the future 
in foresight reports. Storylines are also relational, as indicated by the connecting 
lines in Figure 4. This means that they are part of an intersubjective cultural system 
rather than isolated ‘particles’ of meaning, and thus they need to be understood in 
relation to one another (Norton 2014). 
Methodologically, there are no clearcut lines for identifying relevant imaginaries 
and styles of anticipation. Instead, it is an abductive reasoning process where 
empirical material concerning a certain event or process is closely read and 
preliminarily coded using thematic analysis and some preliminary theoretical 
frameworks (Braun and Clarke 2006). It is useful that the material comes from 
already existing documents, as in my study of the EU data protection reform, because 
then the imaginaries are actually articulated during the process rather than recounted 
to researchers afterwards. After coding the material, different clustering approaches 
can be attempted such as ways of using the future or expressed views on a specific 
aspect such as threats to privacy. Clustering is also a creative abductive process. For 
large datasets, it is possible to use computational methods such as discourse network 
analysis, but potential loss of qualitative richness needs to be considered, and 
methods need to be adapted to the temporal study of imaginaries (Leifeld and Haunss 
2011). 
The study of storylines is by necessity a snapshot. Storylines do not necessarily 
‘travel’ through time, so that we could study storylines at point A and then study the 
same set of storylines at point B. Instead, storylines and imaginaries evolve and co-
evolve over time, as actors creatively work with ideas and institutions (Carstensen 
2011), new imaginaries come into being through variation and some imaginaries 
may practically disappear. This means that significant analytical simplifications are 
necessary for empirically studying actual change processes. Therefore I have utilised 
Weberian ideal types as simplified versions of storylines and imaginaries that are 
intended to capture their essential elements (Clegg 2017). These simplifications may, 
of course, always be contested. 
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4.3.3 Imaginaries 
Thirdly, it is important to investigate individual actor storylines in depth, make their 
embedded assumptions explicit and identify their underlying imaginaries, which are 
not usually directly expressed. Three methods for this are utilised in the dissertation: 
causal layered analysis, the anatomy of plausible futures and the five dimensions of 
futures consciousness. Causal layered analysis (CLA) is a relatively established 
futures research method that can be used to investigate the layers of assumptions in 
futures thinking. In CLA, the phenomenon, trend, image of the future or imaginary 
is divided into four layers of depth: 
1. Litany: the surface description of the phenomenon 
2. System/social causes: systemic causes that are used to explain the 
phenomenon 
3. Worldview/discourse: actor-invariant ways of framing issues 
4. Myth/metaphor: shared cultural narratives and often unconscious beliefs 
about the phenomenon (Inayatullah 2004) 
CLA is intended as a dynamic method where the process moves up and down the 
layers as well as horizontally across different worldviews (the range of relevant 
worldviews) (Inayatullah 2004). However, CLA itself does not indicate any selection 
criteria for relevant worldviews because these depend on the context. 
Drawing on CLA and other layered approaches, I present an anatomy of 
plausible futures (Figure 5) for investigating different kinds of anticipatory 
assumptions behind statements about futures. The outer layer, expectations about the 
future, is similar to the litany layer in CLA. However, the deeper layers of causal 
layered analysis tend to relate to the phenomenon under study, and it is also useful 
to identify more general underlying patterns such as ‘myths of the future’ (Boschetti, 
Price, and Walker 2016). Furthermore, we may identify an additional layer that refers 
to the way of using the future behind the expectations and the change archetype: the 
general aspects of futures thinking or the formal characteristics of a narrative that are 
unrelated to the topic and do not directly concern development patterns over time. 
This is similar to Tuomi’s (2019) use of Mikhail Bahktin’s concept chronotope as 
“the background that makes meaningful interpretation possible”, defining “the ways 
in which events, action, and agency can be described as meaningful elements of a 
story”. 
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Figure 5. Three-layer anatomy of plausible futures (Minkkinen 2019b). 
I have suggested that the five dimensions of futures consciousness may be used to 
identify such general features on this layer (Ahvenharju, Minkkinen, and Lalot 2018; 
Minkkinen 2019b). The five dimensions are: 1) time perspective, 2) agency beliefs, 
3) openness to alternatives, 4) systems perception and 5) concern for others.11 The 
futures consciousness dimensions represent different aspects of a future-oriented 
actor’s sensemaking. Each relevant imaginary as a product of sensemaking may then 
be qualitatively studied using the five dimensions as a frame. In this context, futures 
consciousness may be defined as a phenomenological first-person relationship to 
futurity. The operationalisation of the five dimensions in the case of article III is 
discussed in the synopsis chapter. 
Considering the breadth of imaginaries, there are also generic social imaginaries 
that underlie thinking on a broad range of phenomena but these change slowly, over 
decades and centuries (Taylor 2004). The use of simplifying ideal types (Clegg 2017) 
is necessary because in reality the range of imaginaries is extremely broad. On 
privacy, Perri 6 (1998a, 280) discusses four influential cultural traditions that 
influence thinking on privacy and private life: civic republicanism, liberalism, 
egalitarianism and fatalism. Similarly, we have identified four different metaphorical 
frames for privacy: privacy as the dodo, as the hemline, as savings and as the 
foundations of our home (Douglas 2006; Minkkinen, Auffermann, and Heinonen 
2017). Causal layered analysis and the anatomy of plausible futures are useful 
because they help to investigate whether different statements represent different 
worldviews or simply another aspect or variant of the same worldview. 
 
 
11  The process for deriving the five dimensions is presented in the synopsis chapter under 
article IV. 
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On the deeper level, we may consider different change archetypes and ‘ways of 
using the future’ (Miller, Poli, and Rossel 2018) or ‘styles of anticipation’ (Groves 
2017) that are similar across various topics. Several researchers have drawn attention 
to generic archetypal narratives of change, which include social crisis, eco-crisis, 
techno-optimism, power and economic inequality, social transformation, market 
domination (continued growth), institutional reforms, deep transformation, local 
focus and decline (Boschetti, Price, and Walker 2016; Dator 1979; Hunt et al. 2012). 
These archetypes relate to the content of futures but on a generic and formal level, 
differentiating for instance between continued growth narratives and policy push 
narratives. Ways of using the future or styles of anticipation, in turn, refer to different 
ways of approaching the future such as predicting, simulating, imagining, setting 
goals and so on. The literature on ways of using the future, like the literature on 
anticipation in general, is emerging and at the time of writing there is no definitive 
theory or list of such approaches to futures. Riel Miller and his colleagues (Miller, 
Poli, and Rossel 2018) provide a starting point by distinguishing between three ways 
of using the future: 
1. Optimization: ‘colonising’ the future on the basis of closed anticipatory 
assumptions that inform extrapolation, 
2. Contingency: preparing for anticipated surprises, and 
3. Novelty: novel futures that are unknowable in advance 
Anderson (2010) discusses precaution, preemption and preparedness strategies for 
dealing with contingencies, while De Smedt, Borch, and Fuller (2013) identify seven 
modes futures thinking: intuitive, conventional, eventuality, predictive, visionary, 
technocratic and evolutionary. From the perspective of cognitive psychology, a 
taxonomy of future thinking has also been presented that includes prediction, 
simulation, intention and planning (Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter 2016). 
In terms of methodology, all the presented frameworks (CLA, anatomy, futures 
consciousness and ways of using the future) represent relatively flexible structures 
for qualitative analysis and thematic coding. In practice, the range of actor storylines 
(breadth dimension) and the underlying imaginaries (depth dimension) are different 
axes for coding. The dimensions are intended more as supports to abductive 
reasoning and iteratively increasing understanding of imaginaries rather than strict 
frames for content analysis. All of them help to structure the anticipatory 
assumptions that are used by actors to make sense of a complex reality in a future-
oriented way. 
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4.3.4 Latents 
The dimension of futurity and future possibilities apart from discursive 
imaginaries is also important, as discussed in the theory chapter, since this points to 
the ways in which the future is more than discursive, for instance, through action 
opportunities given by institutional structures. Latent possibilities are always bound 
to particular historical situations in continuously evolving systems, and once 
identified, they may in turn influence the imaginaries promoted by actors. This 
makes institutional change complex, because the timing of action is often crucial, 
and actors may promote competing change projects or have competing 
interpretations on windows of opportunity and appropriate strategies. Identifying 
possibilities must be done cautiously with careful argumentation because they are 
not directly observable, and likewise there is no simple way of verifying afterwards 
whether certain counterfactual possibilities existed. There is no definite guarantee 
that the analysis is exhaustive. However, the four types of selectivities identified by 
Sum and Jessop (2013) provide a framework for identifying latent possibilities in an 
analytical manner. The selectivities are summarised in Table 5. 
Table 5. Selectivities and latent possibilities for agency. 
Selectivities Possibilities for agency 
Discursive Possibilities and constraints provided by the discursive space 
Structural Possibilities and constraints provided by specific structural features 
Technological Possibilities and constraints provided by “knowledging technologies” 
(combinations of discourses and structures) 
 
In the table, discursive, structural and technological selectivities are cross-tabulated 
with the potential for agency for societal actors or actor coalitions. These action 
opportunities are differentially distributed for different actors, for instance 
policymakers, companies and civil society actors. Discursive selectivities mean 
opportunities provided by the established ways of discussing particular topics such 
as privacy. These discourses can be utilised for reframing and novel combinations, 
and for institutionalising them in law, rules, codes of conduct and so on. Structural 
selectivities are potentials deriving from particular features of the institutional order, 
such as rights and actor roles inscribed in law. Technological selectivities are a more 
complex combination of discursive and structural features, so-called “knowledging 
technologies”, such as economic discourses with organisations that support them. 
These yield a powerful influence on actors, even modifying, creating and 
marginalising actor positions, but they can also provide space for reconfiguring 
imaginaries and the institutional order. 
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Possibilities and mechanisms remain latent (‘latent futures’) until they are 
activated. The actualisation of potentials is contingent on at least three factors: 
specific actors’ capacity to take advantage of opportunities (agential selectivity), the 
decisions they take based on strategic calculation and the contestation process among 
different actors. Contingent external events may also play a defining role. Moreover, 
identification of potential always raises a question: “Potential for what?” In 
principle, there are limitless possibilities for advancing different projects, but in 
practice actors’ future-oriented projects are likely to be dependent on their interests 
and their role in the system (e.g. the privacy protection system). Nevertheless, the 
identification of potentials requires some sense of direction, which in single-
organisation foresight is provided by the goals of the organisation. In this 
dissertation, the general normative direction is given by the emancipatory project of 
critical futures studies as reduction of injustice and avoidable suffering and 
promotion of flourishing, and the notion of privacy as ‘breathing space’ for everyday 
anticipation that was discussed in the theory chapter. 
The four stages of the context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents (CASIL) 
approach and relevant methods are summarised in Table 6. The next chapter 
summarises the original studies in the dissertation, and the discussion chapter 
identifies latent possibilities for future privacy. 
Table 6. Stages and methods of the ‘context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents’ (CASIL) 
approach. 
Stage Methods 
1. Historical 
context 
Literature review, document analysis, cultural political economy 
(semiosis/structuration, change mechanisms, selectivities) 
2. Actor 
storylines 
Thematic coding, discourses relevant to a phenomenon, ways of using the 
future 
3. Imaginaries Thematic coding, causal layered analysis, anatomy of plausible futures, five 
dimensions of futures consciousness 
4. Latents Cultural political economy (selectivities) 
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5 Synopsis and Discussion of Studies 
This section provides a brief synopsis of each original study in the dissertation, 
followed by a discussion on the relevance of the findings for understanding 
anticipatory dynamics in the European privacy protection system. 
5.1 Synopsis of the original studies 
In Table 7, the studies are positioned in the privacy dynamics model in the theoretical 
framework chapter and the model of anticipatory institutional change in the 
methodology chapter. 
Table 7. Position of the original studies in the theoretical and methodological frameworks. 
Article Privacy dynamics 
Context, actor storylines, imaginaries and 
latents (CASIL) 
I Overview and earlier version of 
the model 
Historical context 
II Variation in practices and 
discourses 
Analysis of the range of imaginaries 
III Variation, selection and 
retention of plausible futures 
Historical context, actor storylines and 
imaginaries 
IV Variation in practices and 
discourses 
Tool to analyse imaginaries 
V Selection and retention of 
plausible futures 
Comparison of contexts, storylines and 
imaginaries, and a tool to analyse imaginaries 
5.1.1 Article I 
Minkkinen, M. (2015). Futures of privacy protection: A framework for creating 
scenarios of institutional change. Futures, 73, 48–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.futures.2015.07.006 
Article I contextualises privacy protection as a social phenomenon and presents 
a framework for building scenarios that are based on actors, mechanisms and chains 
of events. The article problematises typical heuristic scenarios that are based on 
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intuitive notions about macro-level dynamics. Historical social science is seen to 
provide tools for more rigorous investigation of privacy futures, although in such 
investigations the time horizon is by necessity relatively short. The article argues for 
process tracing as a suitable method for bringing historical perspective as a basis for 
building future paths that emerge from the historical development, either by path-
dependence or path-creation. 
While the approach presented in the article is theoretically justified, it is rather 
demanding and time-consuming for scenario work, which in turn is often pragmatic in 
nature. The two first steps alone, analysing systemic dynamics and process tracing, 
may take months if not years of study if conducted rigorously. The article should thus 
be read as an opening into critical and historical social scientific scenario-building with 
the intention of understanding future potentials of a phenomenon and making plausible 
conjectures rather than directly policy-relevant scenario exercises. However, there 
have been arguments in favour of detailed historical examination also for scenario 
work in the intuitive logics tradition (Bradfield, Derbyshire, and Wright 2016). In 
addition, there is a large risk of reading the results as predictive (historical predictions) 
even though this is not the intention. The framework by itself is unable to cope with 
genuinely novel phenomena, and thus it should be combined with more creative 
methods for investigating novelty. The framework does not explicitly include 
sensemaking and semiotic mechanisms, although it also does not exclude them either. 
5.1.2 Article II 
Minkkinen, M., Auffermann, B., & Heinonen, S. (2017). Framing the future of 
privacy: citizens’ metaphors for privacy in the coming digital society. European 
Journal of Futures Research, 5(7). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-017-0115-7 
Article II discusses citizens’ understandings of futures of privacy through the 
theoretical concepts of privacy conceptions and metaphors and the causal layered 
analysis method. The analysis is based on material from focus groups conducted in 
2012 in three countries: Finland, Germany and Israel. Four metaphorical frames are 
identified: 
1. Privacy as the dodo, identifying privacy as a species becoming extinct 
through human actions; 
2. privacy as the hemline, a conception of privacy as a continuously 
evolving and largely pragmatic issue; 
3. privacy as savings, a highly individualistic view where data is currency 
and privacy is unequally shared; and 
4. privacy as the foundations of our home, an egalitarian view where 
privacy must be safeguarded as a necessary aspect of democracy. 
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In the discussion, we make an argument for considering an ecosystem of 
metaphorical frames where each frame highlights certain aspects of the complex 
phenomenon. Michael (2017) makes a related argument discussing the ‘ecology of 
futures’. Moreover, we highlight two key themes in the focus group discussions: 
individual control and trust in collective privacy protection. Individual control could 
perhaps be better termed as ‘human agency’, because it reflects the concern over the 
possibility of influencing futures consisting largely of dominating elements. This is 
a critical theme because the empowerment of citizens was one of the aims of the EU 
data protection reform. While the General Data Protection Regulation provides strict 
safeguards in some ways, the empowerment aspect of the reform has been criticised 
(Blume 2014). Here it is crucial to distinguish two levels of empowerment: 1) 
empowerment of individuals to manage their own privacy (privacy self-
management) and 2) empowerment of individuals to influence the future shape of 
digitalising society more broadly. While the second type of empowerment is clearly 
necessary, many scholars question the privacy self-management model (e.g. van der 
Sloot 2014). The article thus argues that the privacy debate should be placed in 
broader context of the desirable ‘digital society’ and it should include the full cast of 
privacy actors including citizens, policymakers, technology developers and 
companies. 
The article also makes a contribution by operationalising causal layered analysis 
to study imaginaries or cultural frames using cultural theory and particular concept-
specific themes on the system level. The litany layer of CLA is interpreted as the raw 
text, and the system layer is divided into six sub-questions (conception of privacy, 
perception of threats, responsible actors, solutions, control over sharing and 
development of privacy over time). These questions were used as criteria for 
clustering the focus group participants. The worldview layer is interpreted through 
the four ways of perceiving social relations in cultural theory: individualism, 
hierarchy, egalitarianism and fatalism (Boschetti, Price, and Walker 2016; Douglas 
2006). Finally, the metaphor layer is seen through Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of 
metaphors as conceptual mappings between fields (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
Through the lens of cultural political economy, the four metaphorical frames can 
be interpreted as a type of discursive selectivity, sedimented imaginaries that tend to 
reoccur in privacy discussions. The future emerging from the interplay of these 
frames, other discourses and structural-institutional factors remains unpredictable. 
5.1.3 Article III 
Minkkinen, M. (2019). Making the future by using the future: A study on influencing 
privacy protection rules through anticipatory storylines. New Media & Society, 
21(4), 984–1005. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818817519 
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In article III, I analyse the public consultation phase of the European Union’s 
data protection reform as a case of ‘making the future by using the future’, that is, 
influencing institutional privacy protection rules by using anticipatory storylines. In 
the article, the evolution of privacy is conceptualised as gradual institutional change 
strategically influenced by a network of privacy actors. The resulting privacy rules, 
often layered on top of old rules, represent crystallised and provisional settlements 
of coalition dynamics that create new path dependencies (Mahoney and Thelen 2009; 
Raab and Koops 2009). 
The article identifies two primary storylines promoted by discourse coalitions. 
The first storyline, promoted by industry actors, argues in favour of market 
liberalisation, self-regulatory governance of privacy and allowing the digital future 
to emerge by building trust in the digital economy. Prescriptive privacy rules are 
framed as obstacles to ‘real’ privacy. The second storyline, promoted by civil society 
organisations and consumer rights organisations, starts from the threat of mass 
surveillance and argues for rescuing privacy and human dignity with strict 
regulation. The coalitions thus promote different future-oriented projects. The 
coalitions also seem to discuss different privacy problems, as identified in the 
theoretical framework section. While the first coalition discusses the first and second 
problem, criminal data breaches and the experience of individuals, the second 
coalition is mostly concerned with systemic surveillance practices. 
The article concludes that the second coalition was relatively successful in 
influencing the General Data Protection regulation due to its framing of regulators 
as ‘heroes’ during a critical juncture, its coherence with the prevailing narrative of 
privacy in danger (John and Peters 2017) and the legalistic privacy framework’s 
compatibility with the current trend towards both undoing of old trust-based 
regulations and increasing regulation at the EU level, which Kelemen calls 
Eurolegalism (Kelemen 2011). In sum, we can argue that the second coalition’s 
storyline was a more plausible horizon from the policymakers’ point of view. A 
broader case is also made for anticipatory institutionalism, which is a future-oriented 
mix of historical and discursive institutionalism. 
In methodological terms, the article operationalises the five dimensions of 
futures consciousness (article IV) to qualitatively study anticipatory assumptions in 
storylines. Some additional sources were used to aid the operationalisation. Cynthia 
Selin’s (2006) distinction of five timescapes (trajectories, disruptive, path-
dependence, emerging and indeterminate) was used to categorise time perspective. 
Agency beliefs was considered through locus of control, that is, whether the 
coalitions consider future outcomes as results of their own actions, the control of 
powerful others or outside human influence altogether (Rotter 1990). Openness to 
alternatives, systems perception and concern for others were considered in more 
open terms, characterising how the storylines discuss open and closed aspects of the 
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future, systemic issues and the overall ethical framework, respectively. The article 
also makes use of concept maps, which are a data-driven and visual way of 
categorising qualitative material, the main drawback being the mounting complexity 
and difficulty of processing large concept maps. In the cultural political economy 
framework, the article investigates structural (legalism) and discursive (plausibility 
of narratives) selectivities and the limited variation of storylines. 
5.1.4 Article IV 
Ahvenharju, S., Minkkinen, M., & Lalot, F. (2018). The five dimensions of Futures 
Consciousness. Futures, 104, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.06.010 
Article IV differs from the other studies because it concerns the theoretical and 
methodological aspects of futures consciousness rather than the topic area of privacy. 
However, since privacy is defined in the theory section as rules at the intersection of 
three types of anticipation, the different orientations to the future are also crucial for 
understanding privacy. The article begins from the observation that future 
consciousness is a broadly shared theme in futures studies but there is relatively little 
conceptual development beyond stating its importance. 
In the 1970s, Öystein Sande (1972) presented six dimensions of future 
consciousness based on the Ten Nation Study conducted together with Johan 
Galtung. A notable promoter of the future consciousness concept is Thomas 
Lombardo (e.g. Lombardo 2008, 2017). For Lombardo, future consciousness is an 
extremely broad concept, which encompasses “the total integrative set of 
psychological abilities, processes, and experiences humans use in understanding and 
dealing with the future” (Lombardo 2008, 6). Pentti Malaska (2017) emphasises 
futures consciousness as a characteristic of the entire human race, produced by 
evolution over hundreds of thousands of years and crystallised in technologies. 
While such an integrative concept is useful for understanding the breadth of future 
consciousness, our mission in the article is to develop a simpler descriptive model 
that permits operationalisation as a capacity of human actors. Other notable 
definitions come from Rubin (2002, 906) who emphasises agency, internalised 
futures thinking and links between past, present and future, and from Sharpe et al. 
(2016) who emphasise “awareness of the future potential of the present moment”. 
The article discusses six neighbouring concepts: future orientation, prospective 
attitude, anticipation, prospection, projectivity and futures literacy. These concepts 
come from various fields such as sociology, different branches of psychology and 
the emerging anticipation studies. All of them highlight certain aspects of future 
consciousness, although anticipation, prospection and projectivity may be seen as 
processes that follow from future consciousness. Then, the article outlines 12 lists of 
characterisations, each of which proposes various dimensions. When the long list of 
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dimensions was analysed, we were able to summarise the aspects as five dimensions: 
time perspective, agency beliefs, openness to alternatives, systems perception and 
concern for others. Time perspective concerns awareness of time and the linkages 
between past, present and future. Agency beliefs concerns an agent’s belief in their 
ability to influence future events. Openness to alternatives is connected to creativity, 
imagination, critical thinking and being able to perceive alternative futures, not only 
a deterministic development path. Systems perception refers to systemic and holistic 
thinking that enables considering developments and consequences of actions 
holistically rather than only considering specific subsystems. Finally, concern for 
others is more related to the substantial direction of future development and links to 
values and ethical thinking. Drawing on the normative tradition of futures studies 
(e.g. Bell 2003), we argue that futures studies aims at a better or preferable future 
not just for oneself but also for others, for society broadly, including future 
generations. 
In the discussion, we hypothesise that the dimensional structure of futures 
consciousness is similar in different environmental, cultural and historical contexts, 
although both the ‘profiles’ formed by the dimensions and the content of imaginaries 
may be radically different. In the cultural political economy framework, the model 
of futures consciousness allows the study of constituent elements of semiotic 
complexity reduction by actors when they make sense of future possibilities, and it 
is potentially linked to their agential capacities for strategic calculation. 
5.1.5 Article V 
Minkkinen, M. (2019). The anatomy of plausible futures in policy processes: 
Comparing the cases of data protection and comprehensive security. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 143, 172–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.techfore.2019.03.007 
Article V investigates the policymaker perspective, in contrast to the citizen 
perspective in article II and the stakeholder lobbying in article III. The article 
compares anticipatory argumentation in two fields: the EU data protection reform 
and the Finnish concept for comprehensive security. The policy foresight context is 
characterised by relatively high agency in issues of interest but also high complexity 
with conflicting interests, numerous strategies and compartmentalised government 
structures (Volkery and Ribeiro 2009). In this context, making sense of anticipatory 
assumptions in future-oriented processes is important because they play a significant 
part in influencing the emerging future. 
In the article, I present a heuristic framework for structuring anticipatory 
assumptions, which consists of three layers at different levels of generality. The first 
layer consists of explicit statements regarding the future, similar to the litany layer 
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of causal layered analysis. Underlying these expectations is the second layer, generic 
storylines or scenario archetypes, a limited number of which have been found in 
empirical studies (Boschetti, Price, and Walker 2016; Dator 1979; Hunt et al. 2012; 
MacDonald 2012). The final layer is the futures consciousness that underlies the 
expectations and storylines, and it can be studied using the dimensions in article IV 
as a frame for qualitative analysis. The dimensions together constitute a particular 
orientation to the future, which may be for instance towards optimising planning, 
preparation in the face of contingency or appreciating novelty, using the typology 
presented by Miller and colleagues (Miller, Poli, and Rossel 2018). The layers 
illustrate the difference between images of the future and imaginaries. The outer 
layer, specific expectations, is similar to Bell and Mau’s (1971, 23) definition of 
images of the future as “an expectation about the state of things to come at some 
future time”. The generic archetype layer and futures consciousness, in turn, indicate 
underlying beliefs and sedimented meanings that warrant the term imaginary. 
Key policy documents are used as empirical material for studying the two cases 
of EU data protection (two communications from the European Commission) and 
Finnish comprehensive security (the Government’s common drivers for change 
report). The study found that the data protection case presents an ‘institutional 
reforms’ narrative (Boschetti, Price, and Walker 2016), which frames regulators as 
reactive agents, is strongly path-dependent and focused on the present and recent 
past and highlights strengthening of fundamental rights. The comprehensive security 
case, in turn, features a narrative of potential future crisis with focus on consequences 
for Finland, a relatively long time horizon, limited agency, limited consideration of 
alternatives and focus on the survival of Finland in the context of great changes. The 
data protection case exhibits a planning orientation to the future, while the 
comprehensive security case exhibits a preparation orientation (Miller, Poli, and 
Rossel 2018). The article highlights transparency and reflexivity of anticipatory 
assumptions and responsible use of the future for policy, and suggests the use of the 
heuristic three-layer model interactively in futures workshops for policymakers. 
From the perspective of cultural political economy, the generic future archetypes 
and types of futures consciousness both indicate discursive selectivities, sedimented 
types of discourses or imaginaries, which are relatively stable but may evolve over 
time. 
5.2 Discussion of findings: Europe navigating 
between growth and loss 
What do the studies tell about anticipatory dynamics in the European privacy 
system? Taken together, the articles investigate the different parts of the complex 
change process. In the cultural political economy framework, articles I and III 
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investigate ‘material’ structuration and institutionalisation. Article III also includes 
the semiotic dimension of actor storylines and investigates their interplay with the 
structural features of the GDPR process. Articles II and V, in turn, are focused on 
the semiotic elements of change, by investigating metaphorical frames and the 
anatomy of future expectations in policy documents, respectively. These articles do 
not directly relate to non-semiotic features, although article II draws policy 
implications and article V argues that reflexive, well-considered future-oriented 
policies are likely to be effective. Article IV provides a structure for understanding 
futures consciousness that is always present in some form in social action. The five 
dimensions provide a sensemaking frame and reduce the complexity of orientation 
to the future while, we argue, maintaining its essential components. 
The studies also highlight different actor perspectives. Article II elicits non-
expert citizens’ perspectives on the future of privacy in general. Article III contrasts 
the ideal-typical storylines of industry organisations and civil society organisations 
specifically during the public consultations on the data protection reform. Article V, 
in turn, highlights the decision-makers’ perspective by looking at communications 
from the European Commission. These actor perspectives come from different 
contexts and they are not directly commensurable views on the same process. 
Nevertheless, they contain similar storyline elements and anticipatory assumptions. 
The overall temporal landscape (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013) is a seemingly 
inevitable socio-technical rupture, with increasing digitalisation that places 
significant stress on societal values and institutions. None of the investigated actors 
self-identify as the creators of this rupture, and instead it seems to come as given 
from the outside by technological affordances. Another element of the temporal 
landscape is the speed of change and competitive dynamics that make it difficult to 
foresee or plan the future. In this landscape, different actors navigate with different 
trajectories and projects (Mische 2009; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013). Policymakers 
are left in a somewhat reactive role (article V), citizens struggle between maintaining 
individual control and trusting collective instruments (article II), and other privacy 
actors emphasise allowing the digital age to emerge or reaffirming privacy as a 
fundamental right (article III). 
I would argue that the broader story of the reform is the search for a European 
model of digitalised society. ‘European’ in this context means rooted in values, 
thinking and history that are often connected with Europe rather than geographically 
exclusive to Europe. In this search, there are two primary imaginaries to draw on, 
while the policymaker perspective provides a third one. The first imaginary is an 
epic story of continued growth and the promise of economic success, while the 
second imaginary is a tragic story of losing something important: privacy, human 
autonomy or aspects of European values in general. The imaginaries are summarised 
in Table 8 and discussed below. 
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Table 8. Imaginaries of continued growth and tragic loss. 
 
Continued growth 
imaginary Tragic loss imaginary 
Generic storyline Epic, causal progress Tragedy, impending catastrophe 
Style of anticipation Optimisation, calculation Contingency planning, precaution and 
pre-emption 
Temporal orientation Present future as a 
resource 
Awaiting the collapse 
Meaning of changes in 
privacy 
Benign sociocultural 
evolution 
Fundamental transformation 
Institutional change Institutional drift and 
conversion 
Between institutional drift and legalism 
 
The generic storyline of the continued growth imaginary is a causal progress 
narrative (MacDonald 2012), where present trends promote benign progress if 
institutions allow them to bear fruit. The connected style of anticipation is calculative 
optimisation of institutionalised privacy rules to reap maximum economic and 
societal rewards from the ongoing transformation. In particular, privacy as savings 
(article II) and as a means to foster trust (article III) represent this kind of optimising 
orientation. From this perspective, privacy is a necessary stabilising or regulating 
factor that enables continued growth. The future, in this imaginary, is primarily a 
resource for gaining benefits in the present. This is most clearly visible in profitable 
products based on predictive analytics, which turn futures into data, generate 
predictions based on them, and provide present profit through acting on those 
predictions. However, foresight and future-oriented action aimed at securing 
continued growth may also be viewed in this manner. Security, from this perspective, 
means securing the conditions for continued growth. The ‘hemline’ and ‘savings’ 
metaphors as well as the industry storyline frame changes in privacy as benign 
sociocultural evolution. Institutional change based on this imaginary takes the form 
of either institutional drift, where privacy rules are de facto weakened due to rapid 
increases in surveillance practices, or institutional conversion, where privacy rules 
are primarily intended to stabilise and secure continued economic growth (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2009). 
The ‘tragic loss’ storyline, in contrast, frames the ongoing transformation as a 
tragic and potentially catastrophic sequence of events, which threatens shared values, 
as articulated by the ‘dodo’ metaphor of a species made extinct by human action. 
The concomitant style of anticipation is contingency planning, which focuses on pre-
empting and staving off threats, reinforcing privacy rules and regulating ever-
evolving surveillance practices, ready for the potential collapse of important societal 
values. Privacy is viewed in systemic terms, and therefore changes in privacy 
indicate a fundamental transformation in the social order, where datafication and 
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surveillance change the roles of citizens, public authorities and companies. This also 
means that privacy cannot be optimised on an individual basis in a society broadly 
operating on surveillance logics. Institutional change, seen through this imaginary, 
is poised between drift towards diminished privacy and the continuous race to 
regulate surveillance practices. 
The position of EU policymakers is between these imaginaries, trying to navigate 
a responsible path to a desirable digital society. Thus a third imaginary features 
‘Europe’ as a potential hero. Implicit in the data protection reform process is an 
image of a European vision of the digital age, parts of which are articulated in EU 
policy papers such as the Comprehensive Approach to Data Protection and the 
Digital Single Market strategy (European Commission 2010, 2015). Europe, in this 
imaginary, represents a humanistic alternative to the commercialism and market 
orientation of the United States and the state-led one-party rule of China. The 
European Union has the potential to be a proactive hero by developing sustainable 
and ethical forms of digital economy, but the hero is faced with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, the EU needs to be economically successful to remain, or become, a 
credible actor with a voice on the global stage. The continued growth imaginary 
represents a kind of instinctual drive towards progress understood as economic 
growth. On the other hand, to have something positive to say, Europe would need to 
maintain its commitment to democracy and human rights. The tragic loss imaginary, 
then, acts as a regulating conscience, a kind of metaphorical ‘super-ego’ that 
demands prudence. The GDPR process, as well as the Copyright Directive in process 
at the time of writing, indicate that the EU has aspirations of agency, but it is faced 
with pressures from increasing global competition as well as significant political 
instability within Europe. Because the EU is not self-evidently a powerful actor, it 
must steer between these imaginaries to maintain its contingent sense of agency. On 
the level of structuration, institutional rules are thus likely to contain elements of 
both imaginaries, like the GDPR, which is both a “cause for celebration for human 
rights” (de Hert and Papakonstantinou 2016) and a “monster text”, which “does not 
empower data subjects” (Blume 2014). Discourses and practices that skilfully 
combine these elements are likely to be viewed as plausible and thus 
institutionalised. 
Four aspects are underrepresented in these imaginaries. Firstly, there is no 
positive vision of private life in a desirable future society. Such a vision would need 
to systemically connect privacy to other social issues and articulate a more general 
view of desirable everyday life with digital technologies. Such a vision could be used 
as a basis for imagining a transformation in surveillance practices, the drivers for 
surveillance and privacy protection, since these are intimately related. To what extent 
should policymakers take a stand on defining the values of a good digital society or 
should visions come from civil society? This is, of course, a complex question where 
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political ideologies have different positions. In the next chapter, I will suggest 
‘privacy as breathing space for futures’ as one element of a positive vision. Secondly, 
there is little recognition of the ability to influence the ongoing sociotechnical 
rupture. The onward march of privacy-invasive technologies and practices is taken 
as a landscape-level development beyond the influence of individual actors, leading 
to either tragedy or acceptance. While there are valid reasons to avoid overregulation 
of economic and technological innovation, it should be remembered that this is a 
political choice. Thirdly, technologies and discussions on datafication and predictive 
analytics have significantly progressed since the time when the empirical material 
was gathered, and the prevalence and power of predictive analytics should lead to 
rethinking and re-evaluating privacy imaginaries. Fourthly, there is limited 
orientation towards constructing genuinely novel futures beyond resilience to threats 
or improving economic performance (Miller, Poli, and Rossel 2018; Tuomi 2019). 
This differs from visioning in the sense that the goal is constructing novel futures 
rather than committing to a shared vision. All four underrepresented aspects relate 
to the role of citizens in the digital transformation, which leads to critical questions 
about the ongoing transformation. Who is digitalisation for? What kind of digital 
society and everyday life do different citizen groups want beyond coping in the 
digital age? What alternative ‘digitalisations’ exist as opposed to digitalisation as a 
necessity from above? The role of human imagination and the societal negotation on 
plausible futures mean that future outcomes cannot be known a priori and perhaps 
should not be locked as endpoints for rigid pathways. Nevertheless, it is important 
to maintain societal conditions that enable imagining and constructing future 
horizons beyond continuation of present trends. This is where privacy as breathing 
space for anticipation has a crucial role, and the next chapter will outline latent 
potential for envisioning future privacy. 
As a limitation, it must be noted that the empirical material in this study is from 
2009 to 2012, although the later stages in the GDPR process may also be counted as 
evidence for article III. Many events have taken place and debates have progressed 
since then, and it would be interesting to compare the findings with more recent 
material. Crucial events and processes include the revelations of government 
surveillance made by Edward Snowden, the controversial data practices and 
increasingly concentrated power of the so-called Big Five technology companies,12 
the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal and numerous high-profile data 
breaches. The speed of change is always a dilemma for social science: if studies are 
made rigorously, they may appear outdated; if they are made quickly, this generally 
means less analytical rigour and innovation. I believe that the layered structure of 
 
 
12  The Big Five include Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft. 
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CLA provides a useful analogy for looking at social change. While the litany may 
change extremely quickly, sometimes within one day, the phenomena behind the 
surface are unlikely to change as fast. Similar arguments about the ‘death of privacy’ 
and similar ‘panopticon’ images are repeated continuously (John and Peters 2017). 
In other words, the semiotic practices around privacy may be more stable than it 
would seem at first glance. The institutional structure of privacy protection also 
exhibits significant continuity from the first data protection laws in the 1970s to the 
1995 EU Data Protection Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation 
(Mayer-Schönberger 1997). Moreover, considering the theoretical and 
methodological contributions rather than the content, innovations in theory and 
methodology also develop over a longer period of time than surface phenomena, and 
contributions will not become obsolete when empirical material ages. 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Latent possibilities for future privacy 
In this section, I will indicate latent potentials for future privacy, which stem from 
different aspects of the privacy protection system. John and Peters (2017, 291) state: 
“When a social quality, such as privacy, is only understood in the cultural contexts 
of its loss, it seems that only its loss – and not degrees of change in quality – can be 
declared definitively.” Yet potential qualitative changes in privacy present a more 
fruitful starting point for future-oriented inquiry than investigating whether privacy 
is ‘dead’. Therefore, a more fruitful question is: “What could be the future privacy 
and what are the conditions of its birth?” Through this exercise, I will attempt to 
understand the cultural contexts of the change and renewal of privacy in the digital 
age. 
In causal layered analysis, reframing at the myth/metaphor or worldview/ 
discourse layers is a key part of the analysis, and reframing is also part of many 
scenario methods such as the Oxford scenario approach (Inayatullah 2004; 
Ramírez and Wilkinson 2016). Reframing is an intervention into the investigated 
system and it gives a sense of direction to the investigation of present potentials 
for the future. Such an intervention is always normative to some extent, and in 
this dissertation the key normative commitment is to human flourishing and 
agency. This is in line with the dual causality discussed in the theoretical 
framework: causal mechanisms and selectivities indicate the structurally inscribed 
opportunities while the final causes of actors’ projects indicate possible directions 
of change. Given the strategic contestation around privacy, indicating potential 
for future privacy is not a neutral task. By necessity, it ties into and influences the 
negotiation on futures of privacy, making the researcher part of the debate. In 
addition, I argued in the theoretical framework that the focus on causal 
mechanisms means that explanation is severed from prediction, and we can only 
analytically identify latent possibilities in the present. Therefore imagining far-
reaching heuristic scenarios of privacy protection would not be coherent with the 
theoretical framework. As Groves (2014, 217) states: “Instead of the bold gaze 
towards the horizon [i.e. continued growth], or the despairing look backward 
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[i.e. tragic loss], we have a more difficult, piecemeal road to follow in moving 
forwards”. 
Based on the understanding of privacy as an enabler of everyday anticipation 
in the context of surveillance, I propose a novel metaphor for privacy: breathing 
space for futures. The latent potentials identified in this chapter then point to the 
realisation of privacy as breathing space for anticipation but without attempting 
to predict or envision (‘colonise’) the emergent outcomes of negotiation processes 
through which it may be achieved. The intention, then, is to generate futures rather 
than representing them (Poli 2017, 1:70–72). Through the concern for the 
enabling conditions of human flourishing, the ‘horizon of care’ (Groves 2014, Ch. 
8) reaches far into the future even though future outcomes are not predicted or 
envisioned. 
In Table 9, the latent possibilities for future privacy are cross-tabulated with 
agential selectivities in the columns and other, structurally conditioning selectivities 
in the rows. For the sake of simplicity, only two kinds of agential opportunities are 
considered: top-down and bottom-up. These are heuristic labels that refer to change 
stemming from actors in more central parts of the privacy protection system and 
from more marginal actors, respectively.13 
 
 
13  Horizontal peer-to-peer agency could be seen as an alternative to both top-down and 
bottom-up agency. In contrast to bottom-up agency, horizontal approaches may operate 
with different logics altogether rather than targeting the institutions and policies at the 
top to enact change. While this approach is touched on in the discussion on 
experimenting with alternative practices, focused discussion on horizontal approaches 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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Table 9. Latent possibilities for future privacy. 
 
Latent possibilities for top-
down agency 
Latent possibilities for 
bottom-up agency 
Discursive 
selectivities 
  
Different privacy 
conceptions and 
discourses 
Discursive interventions that 
speak to many conceptions 
while emphasising privacy as a 
societal issue 
Space for discussion about 
privacy beyond fatalism and 
endism 
Broader discursive 
frames 
Strategic connections to human 
rights, sustainability and 
cybersecurity frames 
Coalitions between privacy 
advocates and CSOs with a 
broader agenda 
Generic futures 
archetypes 
Skillful use of ‘intentional 
transformation’ narratives 
Interweaving ‘power and 
economic inequality’ with 
positive narratives 
Structural 
selectivities 
  
Crisis tendencies in 
data-driven 
accumulation 
Strategic intervention 
opportunities (e.g. anti-
monopoly), chance for 
leadership in alternative 
business models 
Possibility of undermining 
legitimacy of surveillance while 
promoting a positive vision of 
alternative digital age 
Opportunities provided 
by the European 
privacy regime 
Space for conversion strategy to 
emphasise fundamental rights at 
the expense of the digital 
economy 
Rights and affordances 
available for strategic high-
profile use 
Technological 
selectivities 
  
Information-processing 
imperative 
Emphasis on human 
sensemaking and values in 
addition to data 
Exposing limits and perverse 
outcomes of datafication 
Competitiveness and 
growth imperatives 
European vision of wellbeing in 
the digital economy, chance to 
promote competition rather than 
monopoly 
Experimenting with living out 
alternatives 
Privacy self-
management 
Conversion strategy to 
emphasise collective privacy 
Conversion strategy to 
emphasise collective privacy, 
potential of data activism 
Dominant ways of using 
the future 
Develop foresight beyond 
planning 
Visioning in civil society 
6.2 Discursive selectivities 
6.2.1 Different privacy conceptions and discourses 
On the level of discourse and semiotic practices, the crucial question is how the 
social and economic imaginaries around privacy and datafication compete and 
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potentially merge with each other or broader imaginaries. The diverse privacy 
imaginaries investigated in articles II and III leave space for both top-down 
interventions and grassroots discussions that seek to conceptualise privacy beyond 
individual property and control. The imaginary of privacy as a collective and social 
value has been articulated several times but it has yet to reach prominence as a 
discourse or in institutional arrangements (Baruh and Popescu 2017; Cohen 2019; 
Regan 2002). 
One particular privacy discourse that should be mentioned is the recurring 
discussion about the “death of privacy”, or the “end of privacy”. This was also 
articulated by the metaphor of privacy as the dodo, an extinct species (Minkkinen, 
Auffermann, and Heinonen 2017). John and Peters (2017) provide an empirical 
analysis of ‘endist’ discourses, concluding that modern privacy has always been 
defined negatively, founded on the institutional conditions of its demise such as 
advancing technologies. The genre of tragedy thus seems to be inherent in privacy 
discourse. The crucial challenge and potential, then, is how to overcome this ‘endist’ 
tendency. In order to be successful, actors need to skilfully use existing metaphorical 
frames and combine them in creative ways to articulate a positive conception of 
privacy beyond fatalism and alarmism. Floridi provides one attempt: “the respect of 
each other’s personal information does not have to lead to a world of solipsistic lives, 
it can be the basis of a society that promotes the value of relations as something to 
which those who are related wilfully and fruitfully contribute, from their periphery.” 
(Floridi 2016, 312) 
6.2.2 Broader discursive frames 
Privacy can potentially be articulated with a number of discourses in novel ways. 
Human rights is possible obvious field of discourse, supported for instance by the 
report on the right to privacy by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European 
Union 2012; United Nations 2014). Security is another broader field of discourses. 
Privacy and security are often discussed in terms of a trade-off, which security tends 
to win as a collective existential need (Peissl 2003). However, discourses on human 
security, sustainable security and cybersecurity may just as well include privacy as 
an aspect of security. The risk with utilising security rhetoric is that this may shift 
the meaning of privacy towards protection from criminal activities rather than 
surveillance and domination as such. 
In addition to security, articulation between privacy and the sustainability 
discourse is crucial, since sustainability is a powerful imaginary in the context of 
climate change. In particular, the social and cultural dimensions of sustainability 
could be connected to a conception of privacy as protection of human dignity and 
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everyday anticipation. Perhaps the strongest prospect for future privacy would be if 
privacy, security and sustainability discourses were all articulated into a coherent 
and compelling story, and they were institutionalized into an Agenda 2030 style 
global programme, also supported by bottom up movement. There is the potential 
for visionary policy design and change from above, particularly in international 
arenas such as the United Nations and OECD since the European framework is 
institutionalised by the GDPR. These broader frames and institutional backing would 
bring legitimacy to the project of renewing privacy protection and potentially 
constituting privacy as an object of global governance. The articulation of privacy 
and human rights, cybersecurity or other issues also suggests potential alliances 
between civil society organisations. When combining privacy with other discourses, 
the critical question is whether privacy is a stable enough boundary object that 
enables joint action without losing its meaning altogether. 
6.2.3 Generic futures archetypes 
Generic futures archetypes provide scaffolding for constructing compelling and 
plausible imaginaries, and it is possible to frame privacy from surprising archetypal 
perspectives beyond tragic loss of shared values or market liberalisation. In 
particular, the intentional variants of policy push and transformation narratives may 
be used by policymakers. However, their plausibility entails trust in the competence 
of policymakers to put forward such reforms. On the bottom-up side, the archetypes 
of power and economic inequality can be used in cautionary accounts, but they 
should be combined with a positive message to avoid fatalism and rearticulating the 
‘tragic loss’ storyline. In this sense, some kind of ‘privacy populism’, making use of 
the public’s concerns, may be a resource for privacy advocacy. 
6.3 Structural selectivities 
6.3.1 Crisis tendencies in data-driven accumulation 
A prominent discourse around privacy protection is related to trust in technologies 
and organisations processing data. This was noted in the industry discourse coalition 
in article III. Data privacy problems are seen by many as a key obstacle to global 
acceptance of information technologies and the Internet (De Hert and 
Papakonstantinou 2013). While generalised trust is important, I would frame the 
debate around the stronger concept of legitimacy, because such significant power 
issues are at stake. As van Dijck (2014) argues, what is at stake is the credibility of 
the entire datafication ecosystem where academia, corporations and the public sector 
all have a stake. Zuboff (2015) argues that the logic of accumulation based on 
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datafication and surveillance spread largely without the knowledge of citizens, and 
therefore the social contract is largely implicit. This is particularly pertinent given 
the scope of datafication for everyday life, social relationships, family life and so on. 
Awareness about the full implications of social media, for instance, has accumulated 
only slowly, and the legitimacy of the model remains largely untested. Legitimacy 
is central because in Max Weber’s terms, authority should only be called authority 
if it is legitimate. Otherwise, it is domination, which is more coercive in nature, even 
if subjects do not immediately experience it as such (Clegg 2016). From the 
emancipatory perspective in critical futures studies, this difference is crucial. 
There is a growing set of scholarly and popular texts that heavily criticise the 
business models of large technology firms and note the negative impacts of 
datafication and social media (e.g. Couldry and Yu 2018; Zuboff 2019). A new 
vocabulary for critiquing the current datafication-driven accumulation logic seems 
to be emerging, highlighting the contradictions and often secretive operations of the 
logic. However, it is uncertain to what extent these discourses will be selected and 
retained and integrated into habitual ways of discussing the digital economy and into 
institutional plans, rules and so on. The agency of key policy-makers is crucial 
because they may use tools such as anti-monopoly legislation to question data-driven 
accumulation. Another important factor is whether privacy is viewed as a relatively 
disconnected individual interest or connected to discourses on human rights, 
sustainability and human security. If the implicit social contract is broadly 
problematised and undesirable phenomena of the digital age are viewed as 
indications of deeper systemic problems, the business models of large technology 
firms could face a legitimacy crisis. Some aspects of this are arguably visible at the 
time of writing in the wake of the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal where 
user data was utilised to profile millions of users and micro-target political 
advertisements in a manner similar to information warfare (Cadwalladr and Graham-
Harrison 2018). 
A potential crisis in the datafied economy could be compared to the global 
financial crisis in 2008, and complex data-driven prediction products may parallel 
complex financial products as causes for crisis. From the futures perspective, crises 
are not only destructive, but they are also productive moments when new imaginaries 
may be articulated (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). The emergence and influence of 
novel imaginaries depends on the capacity of social actors to make sense of the crisis. 
Civil society actors, public actors and companies with alternative business models 
could be able to articulate a novel vision of the digital age. There are many potential 
actors that could show leadership in envisioning a desirable digital society: for 
instance cities, forward-looking companies, small states and coalitions of different 
kinds of actors. On the other hand, incumbent actors may be able to survive crises if 
they successfully rearticulate their vision, possibly in a modified form. This also 
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depends on the construal of the crisis, for instance, whether data-driven surveillance 
is seen as broadly illegitimate or simply having gone too far. In any case, a potential 
crisis is likely to lead to a ‘hyperprojective’ situation and a struggle between actors 
(companies, regulators, policymakers) for path-creation and influencing the future 
(Mische 2014). 
If the surveillance-based logic of accumulation does reach a crisis, one crucial 
question is how far the logic has spread by then from its initial roots in Internet 
advertising. For instance, if ubiquitous sensors in smart cities and many similar 
examples are seen as part of the same apparatus, this may promote a more radical 
response than if the logic is seen as unique to particular industries. This is related to 
the strength of technological selectivities such as “regimes of truth” (Sum and Jessop 
2013, 216) in reinforcing the prevailing system the event of a crisis. If the 
surveillance-based logic is widespread, technological selectivities are powerful and 
possibly supported by discursive innovations, the system may deflect the crisis. 
Even in the absence of a crisis, some companies may differentiate themselves 
with their pro-privacy stance and business model. However, they need to find 
alternative sustainable ways of generating revenue, which is challenging if data-
driven business continues to advance. There is a significant risk of either being 
pressured to adopt business practices based on datafication or being marginalised. If 
such companies are successful, strategically placed pro-privacy companies may act 
as exemplars of alternative approaches to business in the digital age. However, they 
may also remain niche options for a marginal class of ‘privacy-aware’ consumers. 
6.3.2 Opportunities provided by the European privacy 
regime 
The European Union privacy framework and the newly instituted General Data 
Protection Regulation provide several kinds of opportunities for action. In the short 
term, new major data protection rules are not likely to be instituted in the European 
Union. However, in Mahoney and Thelen’s (2009) framework this leaves room for 
gradual institutional change of the drift or conversion types. In institutional drift, 
rules remain the same but their impact changes due to changes in external conditions, 
which generally means increasing stress on existing institutions. Some amount of 
institutional drift is highly likely in the European data protection case because 
technological systems and surveillance practices are advancing at such a rapid pace. 
Conversion, in turn, provides an opportunity for agency. Conversion means a 
situation where formal rules remain the same but they are interpreted and enacted in 
new ways, when actors exploit the ambiguities of institutional rules and redirect the 
institution. Due to the complexity of the GDPR, strategic attempts at conversion are 
highly likely to occur in the short term. Two key objectives of the EU data protection 
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reform were “strengthening individuals’ rights” and “enhancing the internal market 
dimension”, that is, ensuring free flow of data between member states (European 
Commission 2010). There is an inbuilt tension between these goals, and actors are 
likely to strategically emphasise either aspect. In particular, actors in strategic 
positions in the privacy protection system can make use of a conversion strategy to 
emphasise the fundamental right to data protection, acting for instance through 
courts, data protection authorities or privacy-related policymaking processes. 
For citizens and civil society actors, the data protection framework also provides 
rights and other affordances that can be used strategically. For instance, collective-
action lawsuits may be brought to courts on the basis of GDPR infringements. 
Particularly if such strategic use of affordances receives broad media coverage and 
it is backed by appropriate privacy discourses, it may influence the conversion of the 
institutional order towards the fundamental rights emphasis. 
The privacy actor network also includes a network of privacy advocates, in 
Europe and globally. Bennett (2010) asks whether the privacy advocacy network 
could become a social movement. At present, the advocacy network is focused more 
around influential figures, who are networked and attend conferences for instance, 
but no broader collective movement. It could be compared to ‘new social 
movements’ such as the environmental movement or the movement to promote 
rights for sexual minorities. An additional question is what social movements in 
general will look like in the future (Bennett 2010, 206). From a resource mobilisation 
perspective, the resources of the privacy advocacy network mostly consist of expert 
knowledge, which can be utilised for example in campaigns. According to Bennett, 
privacy advocates continuously have to argue about balancing privacy with various 
interests like security, efficiency, personalisation and so on (Bennett 2010, 210). In 
other words, there is discursive selectivity that weakens the message of privacy 
advocates and strengthens the notion of privacy as an individual, even selfish, 
interest. The unclear nature of privacy harms is also a challenge. Moreover, the 
contextual and subjective nature of privacy makes collective action difficult, 
particularly when privacy advocates may value their private life over collective 
action (Bennett 2010, 212). 
It remains to be seen whether the privacy advocacy network is able to 
strategically utilise the affordances in the European privacy regime. One critical 
factor here is the ability of such groups of activists or advocates to engage in strategic 
calculation to reorient discourses and institutions, to persuade, to mobilise the 
public’s private concerns, to displace opponents and rearticulate imaginaries at the 
right time (Sum and Jessop 2013, 217). Certain critical moments, such as data 
breaches or scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal, may provide 
opportunities for activists to strengthen their imaginary and gain popular support. 
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However, numerous scandals have already taken place and have not yet destabilised 
the datafication trend. 
The relevance of ordinary citizens’ agency remains uncertain. It crucially 
depends on digital skills of citizens, particularly higher-level strategic skills and 
information skills (van Deursen and Mossberger 2018) to utilise technologies in 
appropriate ways at the right time to further their ends. A deeper question than skills 
is the impact of datafication on citizens, that is, what kind of persons a datafied 
society ‘produces’. For instance, datafication may lead to a “modulated democracy” 
where people are influenced more by subtle environmental nudges rather than 
rational arguments, and rely increasingly on technological artifacts for sensemaking 
and anticipation (Cohen 2013). In such a society, individuals could have less 
capacity for critical sensemaking, and it could be extremely difficult either to 
mobilise them for activism or for their agency to make a difference on the structural 
level. A more positive vision is that alternative practices may emerge around Big 
Data, enabling new forms of critical agency and publics as ‘knowing’ rather than 
‘known’ (Kennedy, Poell, and van Dijck 2015). Such visions need to seriously 
consider issues of digital divides since certain groups always flourish even in 
oppressive surroundings, and, ultimately, the desirability of a datafied social order 
(Couldry and Yu 2018). 
An interesting special case is presented by individuals in key positions such as 
Max Schrems, whose activism led the Safe Harbor agreement between the EU and 
US to be declared invalid, and Edward Snowden whose revelations sparked broad 
debate about government surveillance. Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 1007) 
hypothesise that actors “who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-
relational contexts can develop greater capacities for creative and critical 
intervention”. Schrems was a law student at the time of his best-known campaigning, 
while Snowden worked for an NSA contractor. Both occupied strategic positions in 
the privacy/surveillance system, central but not at the core, in order to discover 
relevant information and they possessed significant knowledge and skills, either 
legal or technical. It is likely that after Snowden’s revelations, scrutiny of contractors 
is tighter, but complex arrangements with many contractors as well as 
knowledgeable citizens using their rights and skills in unexpected ways remain as 
potentials within the privacy protection system. Of course, the ethics of 
whistleblowing also remains a contested topic. 
The European privacy regime may also act as an exemplar for broader adoption. 
De Hert and Papakonstantinou (2013) sketch a scenario where an international data 
privacy organisation is established, preferably as an agency under the United 
Nations. Such an agency would then be comparable to UNESCO or the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, which are broadly recognised as legitimate global 
players. The authors note three obstacles to such an organisation: lack of global 
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privacy conception, lack of international institutional cooperation and difficulties in 
identifying the proper legal instrument (De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2013). All of 
these problems relate to the complexity of the global order. On the other hand, the 
authors list three enabling factors: commonly felt problems related to technologies 
and political developments, pressure from the public, and shortage of resources 
coupled with the need to globalise information technology (De Hert and 
Papakonstantinou 2013). In principle, a policy push similar to the Agenda 2030 for 
Sustainable Development could also promote global institutionalisation of privacy 
protection. However, this depends on the existence of visionary policymakers or a 
coalition of influencers who are able to retain the novel privacy imaginary in the 
context of significant resistance from competing actors and imaginaries, most likely 
emphasising the rigidity of binding rules in the context of the fast-moving digital 
economy. Such efforts would also need to contend with highly lucrative 
institutionalised business models and industries around Big Data. Thus it is a 
question of reconfiguring the digital economy, not only privacy protection 
institutions. Success would be more likely if accompanied by companies that 
promote alternative business models, providing economic plausibility. The key 
challenge for imagining top-down regulation of datafication is that corporate, 
academic and state institutions all have a stake in broad access to data and public 
acceptance of datafication (van Dijck 2014). 
6.4 Technological selectivities 
The ‘technology’ in technological selectivities is understood broadly, referring 
generally to expertise and knowledge apparatuses that combine discourses and 
structures and are aimed at normalising certain social practices (Sum and Jessop 
2013, 222). In this way, they operate similarly to the surveillance practices that are 
the substantial focus of this study. However, the selectivities discussed here are not 
the surveillance systems themselves but the underlying drivers for establishing such 
systems. The crucial question is the extent to which these technologies leave space 
for reorienting them or adopting different kinds of tactics. Power is never absolute, 
and there are always gaps in systems that allow varying social practices. 
6.4.1 Information-processing imperative 
The information-processing imperative, identified by Cohen (2012), is a set of 
discourses and structures that promotes the view that more information is required, 
for efficient governance, security, economic competitiveness and so on. This is 
connected to the calculative way of making uncertain futures actionable through data 
and modelling (Anderson 2010). This imperative is deeply rooted into contemporary 
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polities, societies and economies, to the extent that questioning it seems nonsensical. 
The process of datafication, in which the social world is increasingly viewed through 
data, has thus far occurred largely without questioning. Critical comments are often 
about biases in data or incomplete data rather than the massively increasing 
collection of data itself (Couldry and Yu 2018). Moreover, datafication is normalised 
to the extent that it is often viewed as an automatic process determined by 
technological advances (van Dijck 2014). However, in reality it is the result of 
numerous human choices and innovations driven partly by currently prevailing 
imaginaries. The practice of scholarship is also founded on the notion that more 
research and more data are necessary. The information-processing imperative clearly 
has many benefits, such as policies based on evidence and advancing medical 
practices that improve quality of life. However, the information-processing 
imperative leaves space for a more discerning approach to data collection that 
recognises, for instance, that ever-increasing data on current human behaviour 
patterns cannot provide knowledge about behaviour under more desirable social 
arrangements but may be used to control populations. The information-processing 
imperative may conceivably be challenged by counternarratives that emphasise the 
power of intuitive human sensemaking and the importance of values in decision-
making. The approach of responsible research and innovation may also provide an 
inspiration by emphasising anticipatory consideration of risks (von Schomberg 
2013). Civil society agents may also expose limits and perverse outcomes of 
datafication in specific cases. 
6.4.2 Competitiveness and growth imperatives 
Discourses and practices around competiveness and economic growth are so 
ubiquitous that they are often invisible, providing the underlying reasoning of many 
day-to-day activities as well as state strategies. In relation to sustainability, they are 
often softened somewhat, emphasising fair competition and carbon-neutral growth, 
for instance. However, the underlying dynamic remains the same, requiring 
continuous search for novel growth opportunities. In the GDPR process, the 
discourse on competitiveness of Europe in tightening global competition was central, 
particularly for the industry coalition (Minkkinen 2019a). Some commentators are 
concerned about the competitive position of Europe in the development of machine 
learning due to relatively strict data protection rules (e.g. Koerner 2018). The 
conventional competitiveness frame provides some potential for privacy advocacy, 
for instance by promoting fair competition rather than monopolistic development 
driven by data accumulation. A more radical top-down alternative would be 
promotion of a European vision of wellbeing in the digital economy, which 
emphasises cooperation and solidarity at the expense of competition. Another 
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possibility is remaining within the discourse of competition and emphasising 
wellbeing and sustainability, for instance, as competitive factors. Civil society 
actors, in turn, have some space for experimenting with alternative practices such as 
platform cooperatives. These approaches are, however, always subject to criticisms 
of implausibility and economic unsustainability, and an economic downturn may 
decrease space for the search for alternatives. 
6.4.3 Privacy self-management 
The so-called privacy self-management approach, briefly discussed in the sections 
on conceptualising privacy (chapter 3) and study number II (5.1.2), has been 
influential in privacy protection instruments for decades (Solove 2013). The 
approach is founded on a notion of privacy as individual control over their personal 
information, and it relies on procedural elements such as notice and consent, which 
are supposed to provide an adequate level of protection. Privacy self-management 
can be described as a technology because it involves both influential discourses and 
institutional rules, and it positions the individual as the active protector of her own 
privacy, giving agency but also laying the responsibility on individuals. 
Within academia, the privacy self-management paradigm has recently come 
under heavy criticism, and Mantelero (2014) even calls it a “crisis of the traditional 
data protection framework” due to Big Data analytics. There are many reasons for 
the inadequacy of privacy self-management, including evidence that people do not 
read nor understand privacy policies, the fact that people cannot comprehend the 
cumulative effects of relations with hundreds of service providers, the context 
dependence of privacy preferences, the unclear purposes to which big data may be 
used and business models that rely on influencing individuals’ privacy preferences 
(Yeung 2017). van der Sloot (2014) argues that the focus on control rights for 
individuals does not address the issues of big data profiling and predictive analytics. 
For him, general obligations for data controllers, enforced by data protection 
authorities or consumer organisations, would be more effective. Austin (2015) 
makes a similar argument, stating that privacy law should focus on power-over (the 
power of the actor conducting surveillance) and power-to (the capabilities of self-
presentation and social interaction provided by privacy), which shifts the focus on 
the surveilling party rather than placing the responsibility on the citizens. Hull (2015) 
calls privacy self-management a “successful failure” because it “completely fails to 
protect privacy” but it achieves something else: it establishes a model of ethical 
subjectivity where individuals are given the impossible task of controlling their 
information disclosures. The basic problem for individuals is that they “frequently 
find themselves trapped in processing conditions they do not understand and have 
no easy way to control.” (De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2013, 307). 
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From a critical perspective, self-managed privacy and surveillance can be seen 
as parts of the same institutional order where privacy legitimates and stabilises 
surveillance. Coll (2014) argues that privacy, defined in individual-centric legal 
terms, is a tool of governance in informational capitalism that produces ‘subjects of 
privacy’ who diligently protect their data in prescribed ways. There is a paradox at 
play here: if privacy is seen as breathing space that provides gaps in semantic 
practices (Cohen 2013), defining privacy exactly and prescribing specific private 
spaces and rights closes the gap and inserts privacy as a smoothly functioning part 
of the surveillance ecosystem. This interpretation fits the legalism discussion, where 
explicit legal rules are seen as a necessary corollary to economic liberalisation and 
the breakdown of old trust-based relations (Bignami and Kelemen 2017). In the case 
of privacy protection, the liberalisation of the flow of data requires legal safeguards 
to stabilise and legitimate continuous data flows. Just as modern work created the 
need for leisure (Gardiner 2000, 84), perhaps pervasive surveillance creates the need 
for privacy as its counterpoise. This would mean that privacy advocates need 
surveillance actors to constitute their identity and, conversely, surveillance actors 
need privacy advocates to legitimate the surveillance regime. 
If privacy is predominantly seen through privacy self-management, what space 
is left for transformational agency to promote alternative views of privacy? Firstly, 
the privacy self-management discourse, while influential in institutionalised privacy, 
does not exhaust the meanings that individuals give to privacy. Control over personal 
information is not necessarily the primary concern for citizens, and protection of the 
home as a private space and the importance of privacy for democracy are also present 
in citizens’ understanding of privacy (Coll 2014; Minkkinen, Auffermann, and 
Heinonen 2017). Therefore, both top-down and bottom-up actors may engage in a 
conversion strategy to emphasise these more collective understandings of privacy as 
a societal condition, or as Cohen (2019) puts it, “turning privacy inside out”. The 
GDPR also includes elements, such as collective-action lawsuits, that point beyond 
self-management, as discussed above. Privacy discourses and the privacy regime 
thus provide affordances for shifting the responsibility from individuals to 
surveilling parties. 
Secondly, citizen-led data activism is an interesting form of bottom-up agency. 
On the one hand, it often relies on the importance of data and the notion of the 
capable individuals of privacy self-management. It is likely that privacy self-
management discourses partly constituted the subject position of a ‘data activist’. On 
the other hand, depending on how data activism evolves, it may have broader 
implications and potentially diminish alienation in the face of datafication, perhaps 
even constituting a bottom-up ‘spatiotemporal fix’ (Sum and Jessop 2013). 
Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein (2019) discuss the MyData data activism movement as 
one case of citizen-led negotiation of desirable data practices. They identify two 
Matti Minkkinen 
90 
diverging imaginaries, technological and socio-critical, and suggest the potential for 
constructively merging the two, focusing on collective and cooperative-based 
governance of data and the creation of data commons. The current predominant 
MyData imaginaries, however, are more focused on technological solutions and 
individuals’ control over their data rather than systemic impacts of datafication or 
privacy as an enabler of everyday anticipation. A more critical stance towards 
privacy self-management may challenge the data activist identity. 
Federated social networks such as Mastodon, which consist of a network of 
servers with open standards and no centre, provide another example of technological 
activism. More broadly, the term ‘Fediverse’ is used to refer to the family of such 
federated platforms. Interestingly, the Fediverse is an imaginary that includes 
technological and social layers and, for some, radical political aspirations. Crucially, 
both the MyData movement and the Fediverse skilfully utilise technological 
affordances, and both of them are less clear about the underlying social and political 
vision. In the case of the Fediverse, the distributed nature may make a unified vision 
beyond decentralisation difficult to achieve and perhaps undesirable. 
Technologically driven solutions are potentially effective, but they risk framing 
privacy as a technical issue rather than a societal one, which may alienate non-
technically oriented people and disregard systemic effects of datafication and 
surveillance. Such developments may also be subsumed under the dominant 
datafication process, as options that cater to the minority of ‘privacy-minded 
consumers’ but do not challenge the regime. 
6.4.4 Dominant ways of using the future 
Groves (2017, 37) suggests that conflicts over imaginaries can actually be 
conceptualised as tensions between “heterogeneous ways of knowing and taming an 
uncertain future”. This is clearly connected to the notion of privacy as the 
intersection between surveillance, everyday anticipation and societal negotiation. 
Utilising the model in article V, the underlying futures consciousness is at least as 
important in these conflicts as the specific expectations about the future. This leads 
to the question how everyday anticipation and deliberative societal future-making 
processes could be strengthened in relation to data-driven predictions. Central actors, 
such as policymakers, could promote foresight practices beyond calculative 
prediction and planning, emphasising participation and collective sensemaking. In 
counternarratives, the focus on human anticipation seems to be central. For instance, 
Shoshana Zuboff’s recent book’s subtitle is “The fight for a human future at the new 
frontier of power” (Zuboff 2019), and Douglas Rushkoff’s recent manifesto is titled 
Team Human (Rushkoff 2019). Ilkka Tuomi also promotes a constructivist 
chronotope of foresight in which the future does not simply happen, but it is the 
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outcome of human action, agency and interaction (Tuomi 2019). Within civil 
society, anticipation and visioning practices can also be promoted, providing 
variation in modes of anticipation. However, the crucial question is whether 
alternative ways can be selected and retained in institutionalised settings and whether 
ubiquitous predictive surveillance diminishes space for other types of anticipation 
by acting as the ‘always-on’ default mode of future orientation. 
6.5 Policy implications: strategic tradeoff between 
seeking plausibility and taming technologies 
The central strategic question that arises from the possibilities analysed above is the 
extent to which privacy advocates aim at explicitly taming the technological 
selectivities. Agency directed at discursive and structural opportunities is required in 
any case. Regulation, increased awareness as well as checks and balances for 
datafication and surveillant attention are necessary to ensure conditions for everyday 
anticipation and human flourishing in the digital age. Privacy is not only a problem 
if individuals articulate it as such, but the power effects of surveillance affect 
individuals in any case. However, regulation of surveillance alone may prove 
ineffective if the underlying roots of surveillance are left untouched. For instance, 
strategic efforts to convert the privacy regime to strictly enforce fundamental rights 
may lead to an ‘arms race’ where data companies continuously circumvent 
regulation efforts with new innovations. If competitiveness in the global economy is 
paramount and more information is continuously sought for policy, there is also a 
continuous stress on privacy regulators to stay on top, and privacy self-management 
may continue to operate as a “successful failure” (Hull 2015). 
Moreover, there is a recursive logic in surveillance where regulators need ever 
more information on data processing of watch the watchers. The Finnish case of the 
intelligence law reform gives an example of this logic. There was recently a dispute 
because the Finnish Security Intelligence Service expressed the need to conduct 
security checks on members of parliament who are charged with monitoring its 
expanded surveillance activities (Pietiläinen 2018). In other words, the monitor 
wanted to monitor the monitor of the monitor. While this “wilderness of mirrors” 
may be necessary in some cases, it risks only increasing the amount of opaque 
surveillance. Ramírez and Ravetz (2011) warn about “feral futures” – out of control 
situations that may result from attempts to tame and control risks. 
How could surveillance technologies be tamed? Explicitly questioning the 
technological selectivities is a risky strategy because it is heavily politicised and may 
alienate many potential allies, diminishing the privacy coalition. All of the 
technologies in question are crucial for maintaining certain identities and subject 
positions. The information-processing imperative goes straight to the heart of 
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Enlightenment thinking and ostensibly enables enlightened, evidence-driven 
decision-making, scholarship and social progress generally. Growth and 
competitiveness provide the drive for many contemporary societal activities, 
including a great deal of research and innovation, as well as fostering successful, 
agential citizens from those who are able to compete. Privacy self-management 
forms the bedrock of international privacy rules as well as the identity of many 
privacy advocates. Finally, ways of using the future are inscribed in think tanks, 
consultancies and foresight approaches. 
There is thus a tradeoff between strategic action aimed at easier, more explicitly 
exploitative practices, risking partial optimisation and inefficiency, and action aimed 
at fundamental knowledging technologies, which risks perceived implausibility, 
diminishing the privacy advocacy network and, at worst, damaging societal 
institutions for questionable benefits. A similar tradeoff is undoubtedly present in 
many forms of activism. While there is no simple solution to this dilemma, I believe 
that there are possible paths to responsibly question even more fundamental beliefs. 
However, critique should be well-aimed and specific about what is critiqued, 
offering solutions if possible, and also well-timed, making use of strategic openings. 
Effective agency to promote future privacy is likely to benefit from both top-down 
and bottom-up agency, as well as their coalitions, and a narrative and an 
organisational structure with multiple layers, leaving space for more moderate and 
radical voices. ‘Future privacy’ can then operate as a boundary object that contains 
different aspirations of future society but enables coordinated action. 
To promote bottom-up agency, political participation and social inclusion in the 
years to come, digital skills need to be taught broadly within the population. 
Importantly, skills need to encompass not only use of technologies but also critical 
thinking, the ability to question technologies and construct technological artefacts as 
well as the ability to make strategic use of technologies in appropriate ways for 
citizens’ own projects. A vision of active citizenship in the 21st century could 
include critical public discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of different 
algorithms in different kinds of systems as well as the ability to choose between 
several algorithms to receive different results. In addition, society needs to be fair 
towards those unable to acquire the cognitive skills for strategic and creative use of 
technologies and for today’s notion of privacy self-management. 
6.6 Future research directions 
This dissertation suggests three primary directions for subsequent research. Firstly, 
more studies should be conducted on how surveillance and privacy work as 
anticipatory processes. While some studies exist (Amoore 2013), studies should be 
connected more explicitly with the discussions in futures studies and anticipation 
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studies, if we are to develop anticipatory practices to more desirable directions rather 
than only critiquing them. Research could also be conducted on systemic links 
between privacy and other fields such as security, wellbeing and environmental 
issues, beyond simplistic trade-offs where privacy is conceptualised as an individual 
interest. 
Secondly, the specific analytical approach and methodological toolkit, the 
context, actor storylines, imaginaries and latents (CASIL) approach, can be 
developed further, critiqued and applied to different phenomena and cases. Complex 
social phenomena such as work, family and mobility are examples of potential 
topics. Conducting studies on different topics with a similar, though not necessarily 
identical, approach could help the accumulation of a critical mass of scholarship in 
futures studies. There are currently many one-off reports on particular approaches 
that are not adopted more broadly, and many methods that are connected strongly to 
one institution. The links between partly overlapping, potentially competing or 
complementary methodologies are often not explicated. 
Thirdly, the dissertation includes a vision or, indeed, imaginary of critical-
analytical futures studies as reflexive study of how futures operate in society. This 
notion of critical-analytical futures could be summarised in a provisional definition: 
Critical-analytical futures studies investigates the relationships between anticipation, 
semiosis, structuration and latent possibilities in particular spatiotemporal contexts. 
It is thus not the study of alternative futures as such. Insofar as alternative imaginaries 
are studied, they are viewed as part of a temporal process that also includes other 
factors. The theoretical foundations of critical-analytical futures studies could be 
elaborated, drawing on critical futures studies, social theory, philosophy of science and 
other sources to consolidate and question appropriate approaches to futures studies that 
are both critical and analytical. Significant work could also be made to operationalise 
critical-analytical futures studies in simpler and more accessible ways. 
The critical-analytical approach also suggests three provisional levels of futures 
consciousness based on the level of complexity and reflexivity. First-order futures 
consciousness means that an actor is oriented towards the future and capable of 
pursuing meaningful projects. Second-order futures consciousness means being 
aware of storylines, imaginaries and visions that exist in society and being able to 
critically assess them. Third-order futures consciousness means the ability to pursue 
one’s projects in the context of many competing or complementary future-oriented 
imaginaries and projects — a set of complex strategic coordination skills (Tavory 
and Eliasoph 2013). These levels are related to the typology of anticipatory 
assumptions suggested by Miller (2018b, 31–34) but more oriented to the strategic-
relational approach adopted in this dissertation. The connections between critical-
analytical futures studies and the emerging field of anticipation studies open many 
interesting questions and directions for future research. 
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7 Conclusions 
In 2013, I began planning a dissertation on ‘futures of privacy’. In one early 
presentation, I even inadvertently added the definite article: the futures of privacy. 
Over the course of the dissertation work, I gradually realised that there is no singular 
‘level of privacy’ that applies equally in all spheres of life at all times and that could 
be projected into alternative futures in the same way as, for instance, the shares of 
different energy sources in energy scenarios. Attempts to ‘rigorously’ measure 
privacy, for instance through privacy concerns, and turn it into a calculable 
phenomenon like energy production, are misleading in my view. There is no singular 
system variable called ‘level of privacy’, but privacy is not reducible to individual 
experiences and concerns either. Instead, privacy is a social institution that consists 
of many types of rules that regulate surveillance practices and facilitate anticipation 
in everyday life. Instead of determining driving forces, there are numerous local and 
global negotiations, which are future-oriented and have a bearing on the possibility 
of maintaining private life in different spheres of life. Privacy is thus situated at the 
crossroads of three types of anticipatory practices: surveillance practices, 
anticipation in everyday life and societal negotiation on plausible futures. Therefore, 
the question I began with, ‘futures of privacy’, evolved from a concern over possible 
dystopian outcomes, to the question of the current situation’s influence on modes of 
anticipation in the present. 
This focus on the anticipatory present rather than futures means that my 
dissertation repeats a pattern that is often irritating for futures researchers. In many 
books and articles, consideration of the future is a short section at the very end, which 
usually considers future research directions and a limited number of key issues (e.g. 
Bennett and Raab 2006; Bennett 2010).14 Initially I was convinced that futures 
researchers need to begin where others end, that is, we need to consider the future 
systematically and at length. During the dissertation work, I realised the extent of 
reflexivity involved in discussing futures. If we accept the theoretical premise that 
imaginaries significantly influence social reality, then promoting an imaginary 
 
 
14  The popularity of such short sections also makes ‘future’ a very difficult search term 
from scholarly databases. 
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makes one an advocate. Alternative scenarios ameliorates the situation somewhat, 
but there is still significant selectivity involved when considering how trends lead to 
outcomes, which outcomes are mutually compatible and how to choose a limited set 
of scenarios. While this is useful in pragmatic scenario exercises in management or 
policymaking, I would argue that futures researchers need to consider the ontological 
unpredictability of sociocultural evolution. In systems terms, each step, such as the 
introduction of a new privacy law, rearranges some aspects of the system, making 
certain imaginaries and paths possible. Although general mechanisms may be 
involved, each situation is historically unique, pregnant with particular potential 
futures. 
While frustrating for those seeking answers about the future of privacy, this 
dissertation has demonstrated that critical-analytical futures studies, as meso-level 
investigation of the co-evolution of imaginaries and institutions, provides a novel 
and necessary lens for understanding the future potential inherent in the current 
debate on privacy. Why is it necessary? In short, the evolution of privacy is at an 
impasse. There is a sense of something valuable being lost but no sense of agency or 
pathway forward apart from technology-oriented visions of continued growth and 
datafication. Such visions place increasing stress on individuals to either 
continuously manage their privacy or give up. In this kind of future, efficiency may 
be increased, but human flourishing is at serious risk. While alternative long-term 
visions may provide inspiration, their link to the current historical situation is often 
tenuous. Regaining a sense of agency primarily requires an analysis of the latent 
possibilities in the present situation and an understanding of predominant 
orientations to the future rather than more representations of long-term futures. This 
dissertation provides tools to understand the nature of the impasse and suggests 
provisional ways forward. Beyond that, it is the task of future-oriented social actors 
outside academia to make the future. 
There are at least two general directions for developing critical futures studies 
on the basis of the framework in this dissertation. Firstly, we can analyse a historical 
situation with particular imaginaries, institutions, selectivities and potential for 
strategic action, taking into account that action is necessarily connected to promoting 
certain values that should be transparent. This is the critical-analytical approach 
adopted in this dissertation, which could be tested with equally complex topics like 
climate change and security in subsequent studies. Secondly, critical futures studies 
can contribute to broadening future horizons, essentially increasing the variation in 
imaginaries and questioning rigid selection processes that tend to reduce diversity. 
In a similar vein, futures studies can also promote the anticipatory capacities of 
actors, either decision-makers or citizens, to enable more multifaceted use of the 
future in making choices. Of course, further development of critical futures studies 
is, like all things, uncertain and contingent on many selectivities. 
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Privacy plays a double role in this thesis. On the one hand, privacy is simply a 
topic, one possible case of institutional change for critical-analytical investigation. 
On the other hand, as I argue in the theoretical framework, privacy is not simply 
another topic for future-oriented investigation. Instead, privacy is a prerequisite for 
a particular style of anticipation, open to human agency, imagination and the 
potential inherent in everyday life. In contrast to the narrow view of privacy as an 
individual interest and the polar opposite of public issues, I have argued for a 
systemic understanding of privacy protection in society. Properly understood, 
privacy protection is a prerequisite for maintaining an open, forward-looking society, 
which consists of citizens who are primarily future-oriented moral agents rather than 
sources of data. To overcome the deadlock between the continued growth and tragic 
loss imaginaries, new strategies are needed for ensuring privacy protection, but 
advocates need to consider plausibility and navigate between promoting increased 
regulation of surveillance practices and trying to tame the root causes of surveillance. 
Miller (2011) states that “to meet our desire to respect the moral imperative of acting 
to create a better future we need to change how we think about the future not what” 
[emphasis added]. If we take this exhortation seriously, we also need to take privacy 
seriously as protection of open and distributed anticipation in the context of 
predictive surveillance. 
In many ways we already live in a world without privacy and most people would 
not describe their life as dystopian. So why not simply move on and enjoy the 
benefits of datafication? There are two counterarguments. First, the readers of this 
dissertation are not likely to experience the heaviest consequences of surveillance 
and may overwhelmingly experience the benefits of personalisation and 
convenience. Marginalised groups particularly in non-democratic societies, in 
contrast, may experience persecution of family members, limited mobility and many 
other effects. Even in democratic states, socially excluded individuals can suffer 
from discrimination on the job market, microtargeted payday loans and a society that 
has categorised them as problems. Critical theorists would argue that many more 
suffer from unfulfilled flourishing. Secondly, according to many commentators on 
issues of climate change, biodiversity and use of natural resources, we are in a world 
on the edge where new solutions are direly needed. We need not only acceleration 
and optimisation of the current system but deceleration and transformative social 
innovations. Solutions that ensure a desirable human future are not likely to be built 
without breathing space.
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Abbreviations 
CASIL 
 
 
CLA 
 
 
CPE 
 
Critical-
analytical 
futures studies 
 
Evolutionary 
mechanisms 
 
 
 
GDPR 
 
Selectivities 
The methodological approach promoted in this dissertation: a 
meso-level study of context, actor storylines, imaginaries and 
latents. 
Causal layered analysis, a futures research method developed by 
Sohail Inayatullah that draws on poststructuralism and critical 
theory. 
Cultural political economy, a framework for analysing co-
evolution of imaginaries and institutions. 
The approach to futures studies promoted in this dissertation. It 
can be defined as the investigation of the relationships between 
anticipation, semiosis, structuration and latent possibilities in 
particular spatiotemporal contexts. 
In cultural political economy, three general evolutionary 
mechanisms are identified: continuous variation in discourses and 
practices, selection of certain discourses and practices to make 
sense of phenomena and retention of certain discourses and 
practices in routines, institutional rules, ways of talking and so on. 
General Data Protection Regulation, a European Union data 
protection framework, which was implemented on 25 May 2018. 
Structured constraints and opportunities that exist in a context for 
sense-making and strategic action. Selectivities can be divided 
into structural, discursive, technological and agential ones. 
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